S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. Whether the terminus a quo for computing the period of limitation of 12 years under Art.136 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is the date of the original decree alone or in the event of an appeal that of an appellate decree as well is the somewhat significant question necessitating this reference to the Full Bench.

2. The chequered history of the litigation has completed its silver jubilee. The decree-holder filed Title Suit No. 161 of 1961 against the judgement-debtor which was dismissed by the 2nd Additional Munsif, Patna, way back on the 25th of January, 1964. A title appeal was preferred against the same in which the judgement and decree of the lower Court was set aside and the suit decreed vide judgement dated the 23rd of December, 1969. The judgement-debtor thereafter filed Second Appeal No. 121 of 1970 which ultimately came to be dismissed after a decade on the 21st of March, 1980.

3. The opposite party decree-holder filed Execution Case No. 7 of 1983 in the Court of the Execution Munsif, Patna. Therein petition under O.XXI, R.23 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the Code) and Art.136 of the Indian Limitation Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was preferred by the judgement-debtor taking the stand that the execution proceedings were beyond period of twelve years from the grant of the decree on the 23rd of December, 1969. Basic reliance was placed on AIR 1980 Pat 280, Kali Prasad Bajpayee V/s. Bhagwati Prasad. The execution Court, however, rejected the petition of the judgement-debtor.

4. Aggrieved thereby, the present civil revision was preferred. At the threshold stage of admission, the learned single Judge noticed the divergence of opinion in Kali Prasad Bajpayees case with a long line of contrary precedent and, therefore, directed the case to be disposed of by a Division Bench. Before the Division Bench again a frontal conflict betwixt Kali Prasad Bajpayees case and AIR 1978 Andh Pra 342 and AIR 1976 Cal 122, Posani Ramachandraiah V/s. Daggupati Seshamma and Shyama Pada Choudhury V/s. Saha Choudhury and Co. respectively taking a contrary view was noticed and the matter was referred to the Full Bench for an authoritative decision.

5. Ere one examines the rival contentions, it seems apt and, indeed, necessary to notice the legislative history of the provision which also tends to provide a clue to the problem. Prior to the enactment of the Limitation Act, 1963 , the relevant provisions governing the field were S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Arts.182 and 183 of the old Limitation Act, 1908. It is somewhat manifest that the language of Art.182 of the old Limitation Act had created a hornets nest of controversy and a deep cleavage of judicial opinion. This was noticed by the Law Commission for repealing the said article and enacting the present Art.136 in the following terms :-

"Art.182 (old) has been a very fruitful source of litigation and is a weapon in the hands of both the dishonest decree-holder and the dishonest judgement-debtor. It has given rise to innumerable decisions. The commentary in Rustomjis Limitation Act (5th Edition) on this article itself covers nearly 200 pages. In our opinion the maximum period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court should be 12 years from the date when the decree or order became enforceable (which is usually the date of the decree) or where the decree or subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date at recurring periods the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree. There is, therefore, no need for a provision compelling the decree-holder to keep the decree alive by making an application every three years. There exists a provision already in S.48 of the Civil Procedure Code that a decree ceases to be enforceable after a period of 12 years. In England