1991 Supreme(Pat) 343
PATNA HIGH COURT
S.B.Sinha, J.
Mohd.Khalil Alias Mohd.Khalil Ansari
Versus
Mohd.Majid Ansari
Civil Revision No. 438 of 1989 ;
Decided On : SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
Important Points
Subject
Property Law - Landlord and Tenant
Act Referred
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : S.115
Headnote
EVICTION SUIT - BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT - SUITABILITY OF PREMISES - SUBSTANTIAL REQUIREMENT - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 11(1)(C) OF THE BIHAR BUILDINGS (LEASE, RENT AND EVICTION) CONTROL ACT, 1982.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs filed an eviction suit against the defendants on the ground of personal necessity, claiming that they required the suit premises for starting a welding business. The defendants contested the suit, contending that the plaintiffs' requirement was not bona fide, the premises were not suitable for a welding business, and that the plaintiffs had a vacant premises that could be used for the same purpose.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiffs had been able to prove their bona fide requirement for the suit premises. It held that the plaintiffs' intention to start a welding business was genuine, and that they had the necessary financial resources to do so. The court also found that the premises were suitable for a welding business, and that the plaintiffs did not have any other vacant premises that could be used for the same purpose.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs' requirement for the suit premises was bona fide? 2. Whether the premises were suitable for a welding business? 3. Whether the plaintiffs had any other vacant premises that could be used for the same purpose?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plaintiffs' requirement for the suit premises was bona fide, as they had the intention to start a welding business and had the necessary financial resources to do so. The court also found that the premises were suitable for a welding business, and that the plaintiffs did not have any other vacant premises that could be used for the same purpose. The court further held that the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs' requirement would be substantially met by evicting them from a portion of the suit premises was not supported by the evidence on record.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the defendants' revision application and upheld the trial court's decree for eviction.
S. B. Sinha, J.
1. This application under Sec.14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to for sake of brevity as the Act) arises out of a judgment and decree dated Sth June, 1989 passed by Sri P. K. Upadhayay, Additional Munsif, 2nd Court. Dhanbad in Title Eviction Suit No.34 of 1985, 17 of 1988, whereby and whereunder the said learned court decreed the suit for eviction filed by the plaintiffs-opposite parties on the ground of their personal necessity.
2. Admittedly, Sri Suleman Ansari father of the plaintiffs-opposite parties was owner of the suit premises which have been described in Schedule-A of the plaint. The plaintiffs inducted the defendants in a portion of the Schedul-A premises which have been described in Schedule-B of the plaint, on a rent of rs.75/- per month.
3. According to the plaintiffs, the plaintiff no.1 has been working as a welder and he has decided to carry on his own welding business and thus the suit premises is bona fide and in good faith required for his own use and occupation.
4. The deferdants-petitioners appeared and filed a written statement in the aforementioned suit upon obtaining leave of the court to contest the same wherein, inter alia, it was alleged that the plaintiffs intended to enhance the monthly rent illegally from Rs.75/- to Rs.150/- per month and the suit had been filed as the defendants did not agree to the said proposal of the plaintiffs.
5. It was further contended that the plaintiff no.1 is doing welding work in Dumri and the suit premises is not required for carrying on business.
6. One the basis of the aforementioned pleading of the parties, the learned court below framed the following issues :-
"1]. Is the suit maintainable either in law or fact ? 2]. Is the suit maintainable in its present form ? 3]. Is the suit bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of the parties ? 4]. Is there any cause of action for the present suit ? 5]. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree as prayed for ? 6]. To what relief or reliefs if any the plaintiff is entitled to ?"
7. The learned court below upon consideration of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have been able to prove their bona fide requirement in respect of suit premises.
8. Mr R K. Marathia, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has principally raised four questions in support of this application. The learned counsel firstly submitted that as the plaintiff no.1 did not have enough money to start a business, his requirement cannot be said to be bonafide. The learned counsel, in this connection has relied upon a decision of mine in Ramesh Chandra Agarwal and ors. V/s. Bhushan Ram, (1989 PLJR, i 188); 1989 (2) BLJ 312,
9. The learned counsel next contended that at the time of letting out the premises itself the requirement of the plaintiff no.1 existed, the question of requirement for the suit premises reasonably and in good faith does not arise.
10. The learned counsel furtler contended that the suit premises is not suitable for starting a business in welding and in fact, the plaintiffs have a vacant premises which could be utilised for the said purpose.
11. The learned counsel further contended that in any event, as the learned court below has not taken into consideration the question as 10 whether the requirement of the plaintiff would be substantially met by evicting the defendants-petitioners from a portion of the suit premises as is required under the proviso appended to Sec.11 (1) (c) of the said Act, the impugned order is vitiated in law.
12. According to learned counsel, it is admitted that the suit premises measures 8x 18 and thus it was possible to divide the suit premises into two separate shop premises.
13. Mr. Marathia in support of his contention draw my attention to the evidences of PWs.2.4, 5 and 6 as also that of DW 1 and DW.2.
14. Mr. M. M. Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposit