S.B.Sinha, J.

1. This appeal has been referred by a learned single Judge of this court by order dated 20.8.1993 to a Division Bench, inter alia, for consideration of the following questions:

(i) Whether an appeal is maintainable against an order passed by the Accidents Claims Tribunal under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988;

(ii) Whether the Tribunal can direct payment of interest while passing an order under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

2. In view of the pure questions of law involved in this appeal, it is not necessary to notice the fact of the matter in a great detail.

3. It appears that respondent Nos. 1 to 6 filed an application in terms of Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, who has also been appointed as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. By reason of the impugned order dated 4.4.1991, the learned Judicial Commissioner has directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000.00 by way of an ad interim compensation with an interest of 12 per cent per annum from the date of presentation of the petition within one month.

4. Mr. P.K. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that the direction to pay the compensation in terms of provisions of Sec. 140 of the aforesaid Act would also be deemed to be an award within the meaning of Sec. 173 thereof and thus an appeal would be maintainable. The learned counsel in support of his contention relied upon a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Padmavathy 1990 ACJ 751 (Kerala). The learned counsel further submitted that in any event the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant interest while passing an order of ad interim compensation. Learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon Dhapa Kanwar V/s. Kishanlal 1992 ACJ 163 (Rajasthan).

5. Mr. N.N. Tiwary, learned counsel appealing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that from a plain reading of Sec. 140 of the said Act, it would appear that for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction in terms thereof, no adjudication about the rival contentions/ claims of the parties is required to be made, nor the parties can join the issues in relation thereto and as such an order passed thereunder cannot be said to be appealable. According to the learned counsel, an order passed under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be held to be an award for the purpose of maintainability of an appeal in terms of Sec. 173 thereof. The learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon a decision in the case of Gaya Prasad V/s. Suresh Kumar 1992 ACJ 200 (MP). It was further submitted that the Claims Tribunal has an inherent power to grant interest pendente lite. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Prakash Chandumal Khatri V/s. Suresh Pahilajrai Makhija 1992 ACJ 369 (Bombay).

6. It appears that different High Courts have taken different views with regard to the maintainability of an appeal as also with regard to power of the Tribunal to grant interest. However, no decision of this court has been brought to our notice.

7. Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act which is in Chapter X of the said Act provides for liability to pay compensation on the principle of no fault. An owner of a vehicle thus would be liable to pay compensation in case death or permanent disablement to any person has resulted from an accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle or vehicles and the amount of such compensation in terms of Sec. 140 (2) is fixed as Rs. 25,000.00 in case of death and Rs. 12,000.00 in case of permanent disablement.

Sub-section (3) of Sec. 140 postulates that the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which claim was made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the