SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1996 Supreme(Pat) 462

PATNA HIGH COURT
Dharampal Sinha, J.
Manju Roy
Versus
Ghanshyam
Civil Revision No. 608 of 1996 ;
Decided On : JULY 30, 1996

In cases arising out of an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 praying for restitution of conjugal rights, if the other party denies firmly the marriage with the applicant, there remains no scope for reconciliation and any effort for reconciliation made is bound to go in vain.

Headnote:

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 - SECTION 9, 23(2) - RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS - RECONCILIATION - COURT'S DUTY - SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS - CASE WHERE MARRIAGE IS DENIED - NO SCOPE FOR RECONCILIATION - COURT CANNOT DIRECT RECONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner challenged an order directing her to appear for reconciliation proceedings in a restitution of conjugal rights case filed by the opposite party under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The petitioner denied the marriage with the opposite party and had filed a written statement to that effect.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that in cases where one party firmly denies the marriage, there is no scope for reconciliation and any effort for reconciliation is bound to go in vain. The court found that the facts and circumstances of the case did not leave scope for any conciliation and that it was a case of such nature in which it was not possible at all to bring about conciliation.

Issues: Whether the court can direct reconciliation proceedings in a restitution of conjugal rights case where one party firmly denies the marriage.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the duty of the court to make every endeavor to bring about reconciliation between the parties under Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is subject to the nature and circumstances of the case. Where one party firmly denies the marriage, there is no scope for reconciliation and any effort for reconciliation is bound to go in vain. In such cases, the court cannot direct reconciliation proceedings.

Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition, set aside the impugned order, and directed the court below to proceed and dispose of the miscellaneous case according to law, without making any endeavor for bringing about reconciliation between the petitioner and the opposite party.

Judgment

Dharmpal Sinha, J.

1. Heard learned Counsel for the both sides.

2. In this revision-petition, the petitioner Manju Roy, has assailed the order dated 12.3.1996 passed by the 2nd additional District Judge, Saharsa, in misc. Case No.7 of 1994 which had been instituted on the basis of an application which opposite party No.1. had filed under Sec.9 of the Hindu marriage Act, 1955 (the Act) praying for restitution of conjugal right. By the impugned order, the learned Court below had asked the parties to appear before the Court below on 27.3.1996 for reconciliation. There was also specific direction to both the parties to appear personally.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that in this case the petitioner had taken a stand that she is not married to Opposite party No.1, who had filed the application under Sec.9 of the Act; that she is the wife of one Vijay Kumar Roy; and that even prior to the filling of the application under Sec.9 of the Act by opposite party No.1, she had instituted some cases including case for maintenance and criminal case against her husband Vijoy Kumar Roy. According to her, in view of the stand taken by the petitioner and in view of the objection raised by her that she is not the wife of ghanshyam (Opp. Party No. l), there could be no question of reconciliation and the learned Additional District judge has committed material irregularity in asking the petitioner by the impugned order to personally appear before that Court for reconciliation.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for Opposite party No.1 contended that the petitioner is the wife of opposite Party No.1-Ghanshyam as is the stand taken by Opposite party No.1 and the question whether or not she is the wife of Ghanshyam will be determined only after the finding will be arrived at on the basis of the evidence which the parties will adduce. According to the learned Counsel for Opposite party No.1, before the Additional district Judge himself, the petitioner may take the stand that as she is not his wife, she is not agreeable to reconciliation.

5. I have considered carefully the submissions and I am inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner for the reason that is being indicated below.

6. The impugned order obviously seems to have been passed under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act with reads as follows:

"before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 13. "

This provision imposes a duty of the Court considering any matrimonial matter under the Act to make endeavour for bringing out reconciliation between the parties. The expression, "it shall be the duty of the Court in the first instance, in every case" used in Section 23 (2) of the Act would indicate that it is mandatory obligation imposed by this law to make effort to bring about conciliation between the parties. But the further expression "where it is possible to do so consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case" appears to restrict the mandatory obligation only to such cases where it is possible to bring about reconciliation "consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. " It seems to me that the nature and circumstances of this case is such as there is no possibility at all of any reconciliation and there is no scope of doing this exercise of making endeavour to bring about the reconciliation between the parties. Indeed it will be a futile exercise and the law as contained in Sec.23 (2) of t



Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top