The third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which requires an employer to deposit the compensation amount before filing an appeal, also applies to insurers who step into the shoes of the insured employer.

N.Pandey, J.

1. The appellant (insurer) being aggrieved by an order of the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Commissioner, Workmens Compensation, dated October 27, 1994, passed in C.W.C. No. 9 of 1993 has preferred this appeal under Sec. 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act (in short the Act). By the impugned order, the insurer was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 76,885.20 (Rupees seventy-six thousand] eight hundred and eighty-five and twenty paise) to the claimants as compensation for the death of Rajendra Ojha on account of an accident, which took place in the night of August 16/17, 1991 while he was driving a truck of respondent-employer bearing registration No. WML 2337.

2. It appears when this case was taken up before a learned Single Judge of this Court, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondents on the maintainability of this appeal due to non- compliance of the mandatory requirement of the third proviso of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 of the Act. It was contended that in; order to maintain this appeal under Sec.30 of the Act, the appellant was required to enclose a certificate by the Commissioner with the memorandum to the effect that he had deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. Since the appellant failed to do so, the appeal was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as not maintainable.

3. No doubt at the later stage a certificate in terms of the aforesaid requirement was filed by way of abundant precaution, but learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, however, submitted that having regard to language of third proviso to Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 of the Act, particularly the word "employer", the insurer (appellant) not being employer of the deceased, had no obligation to comply with the said requirement. In support of his contention learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of ; a learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Saifuddin and Ors., 1992 ACJ 736 and the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Kanchan Bewa and Ors., 1994 ACJ 138 (Orissa High Court). Therefore, having regard to the important question as also since no decision of this Court was cited, the case was referred to a Division Bench at the state of admission itself.

4. I have heard learned Advocates appearing on behalf of both the parties as also perused the terms of reference, therefore, this appeal is being disposed of at the stage of admission itself.

5. Before considering the crucial question, it would be relevant to notice that there is no dispute in this case that at the time of accident late Rajendra Ojha was in the employment of Gulab Chand, the owner of the truck (Respondent No. 5) on a monthly salary of Rs.900.00 . This is , also not in dispute that as per terms of the Insurance Policy, appellant-insurer was liable to any compensation on behalf of the respondent-employer.

6. In order to appreciate the legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties, it is desirable to extract the relevant provision of Sec. 30( 1 )(a) with its third proviso hereunder:

"30. Appeals. - (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum.

*****

Provided further that no appeal by an employer under Cl.(a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by, a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against."

7. From the facts as well as statutory provisions, noticed above, there is no dispute that appellant (insurer) is entitled to file appeal against the impugned order and award under Clause (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 of the Act. The only dispute is whether in absence of the compliance of the requirement of the third proviso of Sec. 30 as re