The initiation of a proceeding under Section 48e of the Bihar Tenancy Act is a quasi-judicial matter, and it is open for a landlord to show to the Collector, prima facie, that the dispute raised is malafide and baseless and has been raised to harass him.

S. N. Jha, S. J. Mukhopadhaya, JJ.

1. This letters patent appeal arises from the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court in cwjc No.6575 of 1994. The appellants, 31 in number, along with others had filed applications under Section 48e of the Bihar Tenancy Act (hereinafter called, the Act) which were rejected by the Deputy Collector Land reforms (DCLR), Teghra exercising the powers of the Collector under the Act. They came to this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. The challenge to the order of the DCLR having gone in vain before the learned Single Judge they have come in appeal before the Division bench.

2. The order of the DCLR seems to have been assailed before the learned single Judge on the ground that at the stage of initiation of the proceeding under Sec.48e (1) of the Act, the collector is not required to hold a fullfledged trial, he is merely required to refer the dispute to the Conciliation board. The DCLR however issued notice to the landlord and went in to the merits of the case and ultimately rejected the applications without following the procedure laid down under section 48e and the rules framed in that regard. Such a course, according to the appellants, was not in accordance with the Full Bench decision of this court in dhanji Singh V/s. The State of Bihar, AIR 1979 Patna 259 : 1979 BBCJ ; 1979 BLJ 621 521 (F. B.) identical submissions were made before us as well. The only point for consideration is whether the impugned order of the DCLR is in accordance with law. In other words, whether the order of the learned Single judge dismissing the writ petition, of the appellants required any modification.

3. N. P. Singh, J. who delivered the leading judgment in the case of Dhanji singh (supra) after considering the relevant provisions of the Act and the case law on the point observed:

"i have no hesitation in holding that the proceeding under Sec.48e can be initiated only after the Collector is satisfied that one of the three requisite conditions exists. On what materials and in what manner the Collector shall be satisfied about existence of one or the other requisite conditions for initiation of the proceeding, no hard and fast rule can be laid down, It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. "

Counsel for the appellants contended that, firstly, the DCLR ought not to have issued notice to the landlord, for such a course is not warranted in view of the decision in the aforesaid case. Secondly, the DCLR having issued notice to the landlord, he must be deemed to have been taken cognizance of being prima facie satisfied about the existence of dispute. The proceeding within the meaning of Sec.48-E (1)therefore must be deemed to have been formally initiated. It was thereafter not open to him to enter upon the dispute himself and decide the same without referring it to the Conciliation Board. Reliance in support of the contention has placed on Kailash Prasad V/s. The state of Bihar, 1994 (1) PLJR 632 1994 (2) BLJ 259 Counsel also referred to the following observations in Dhanji singhs case.

"the Sub-divisional Officer as Collector has not only heard both the parties but he has looked into the documents and as considered the respective contentions advanced on behalf of both the parties at the stage of initiation of the proceeding. Admittedly, this case is not one of those cases where the landlord at his own initiative appeared before the Collector, has produced such a material which established the malafide nature of the application filed on behalf of the petitioner. The impugned order itself shows that the Sub divisional officer has purported to adjudicate the respective claims of the parties and has negatived the claim of the petitioner after recording a finding. In such a situation, I am left with no option but to hold that the impugned order has been passed by adopting a procedure which is not sanctioned by law. "

4. The learned Single Judge has, instead, relied on Sukhdeo Po