The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 85 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981 are not ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution as the Act is a self-contained Act and the Vice-Chairman being a persona designata appointed by the legislature itself can act as a civil court for the purposes laid down in Chapter IX of the Act.

1. The order of the learned Single Judge dated 22.6.99 passed in C.W.J.C. no. 4423 of 1988 has been impugned by the appellant in this Appeal.

2. Factual backgrounds are necessary to be portrayed before appreciating the contentions made on behalf of the parties.

3. The Patna Regional Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as Authority) is the successor of the Patna Improvement Trust which ceased to exist with effect from 24.5.1975 by virtue of the Bihar Regional Development Ordinance and Act. The Patna Improvement Trust settled a vast area of land with brick manufacturing facilities in favour of the appellant in the year 1975 for certain period. The said lease came to an end in the early half of 1977 but settlement was extended for further period till June 30, 1981. The appellant even after expiry of the period of settlement did not vacate the land which necessitated for further extension of period of settlement. The Authority requested the appellant through notices to vacate the land but on appellants refusal instituted a proceeding under Section 85 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the appellants ejectment from the land and also for the determination of damages payable by him for the period during which he occupied the land unauthorizedly.

4. The Vice-Chairman of the Authority, being the prescribed authority under the Act, heard the matter and by his order dated 25.4.1988 directed for the appellants ejectment within seven days from the date of that order and also to determine the amount of damages payable by him to the Authority. At this stage, it is necessary to bear in mind that initially against the notice issued to the appellant by the Vice-Chairman of the Authority he moved this Court in C.W.J.C. no. 5252 of 1987 but the same was not entertained by the Division Bench and with some observation the application was directed to be withdrawn by order dated 2.3.1987. The final order of the Vice-Chairman dated 25.4.1988 was challenged in C.W.J.C. no. 4423 of 1988 which was admitted on 12.7.1988 and operation of the order was stayed by this Court subject to the appellants depositing a sum of Rs. 50,000/- within one month from that order. Ultimately hearing was taken up in the year 1999. The learned Single Judge after detailed discussion came to the conclusion that the submission made on behalf of the appellant had no force and thus dismissed the writ application directing the appellant tovacate the land within seven days from the date of that order failing which the Authority was given liberty to approach the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna for taking forcible possession from the appellant. The Authority was directed to redetermine the amount of damage in terms of Section 82 (2) of the Act and to calculate the amount till the date on which the appellant hands over the possession of the land to the Authority. The writ petition was dismissed with costs of Rs. 3000/- which was to be paid to the Bihar Legal Services Authority.

5. Mr. Kanth, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the provisions as contained in sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 85 of the Act are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch the Vice- Chairman being one of the officers of the Authority could not have entertained the petition for ejectment filed by the Secretary of the Authority because a person cannot be a judge of his own cause. According to him, Section 3 provides that the Vice-Chairman is to be one of the members of the Authority and, as such, the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) empower the Vice-Chairman to act as a judge of his own cause. Learned counsel thus submitted that these two provisions violate the guarantee of equality and reasonableness of procedure as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution.

6. In our view, the contention of Mr. Kanth has no substance. From a bare perusal of different provisions of