The special procedure mandated by the Rent Control Act cannot be overridden by invoking inherent powers under Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

A.K.Sinha, J.

1. Heard the learned Counsel for both the sides.

2. The instant revision application has been directed against the order dated 2.5.2000, whereby the learned Munsif atChaibasa, stated the further proceedings in Title Eviction suit No. 8 of 1997 till the disposal of F.A. No. 57 of 1997 (R), pending before this Court under Sec. 151 read with Sec. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3. The admitted facts are that the Title Suit No. 39 of 1982 was filed by the opposite party against Prof. Jagannath Poddar for specific performance of contract, which was partly decreed in his favour by the Sub-Judge, against which F.A. No. 57 of 1997 (R) was referred and the same is pending before this Court. The petitioner filed Title Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 for eviction of the opposite parties. A prayer was made on behalf of the defendant-opposite parties in the said Title Eviction suit that the proceedings in the suit may be stayed till the disposal of the F.A. No. 57 of 1997 (R) pending before this Court.

4. The learned Court below after hearing both the sides was of the view that although the parties and the subject-matter of the suit are the same but issue were different, but in order to avoid multiplicity of the suit, stayed the further proceedings in Title Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 in exercise of its power under Sec. 151 read with Sec. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. In view of the fact that the issued in Title Suit No. 39 of 1982 and Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 are different, the further proceeding in the subsequent suit cannot be stayed under Sec. 151 read with Sec. 10 of the C.P.C. So far exercising the powers under Sec. 151 read with Sec. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for staying the further proceedings in the Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 is concerned, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dr. N.P. Tripathi V/s. Smt Dayamanti Devi and Anr. 1987 PLJR 724, wherein it was held as hereunder:

By resosting to the inherent powers under Sec. 151 of the Code, the petitioner will be frustrating the very object and purpose of a bilateral munificent piece or legislation such as the Control Act of 1982 setting at naught the legislative mandate thereby rendering nugatory the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Act. I can say with all the vehemence at my command that to take recourse to such a procedure would not only be not subservient to the ends of justice but would be overriding the special procedure mandated by a self-contained Code as the Control Act. It would indeed, be an abuse of the process of the Court by trying to induce the Court to render Sec. 14 of the Control Act as otiose and redundant. Therefore, ultimately, I am constrained to hold that invoking the inherent powers of the Court under Sec. 151 of the Code would, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and there can be no manner of doubt that such a recourse cannot be said to sub-serve the ends of justice, rather would be inducing the Court to resort to a procedure which will do complete injustice to the parties as contrary to ex debite justitiae.

6. In view of the aforesaid decision, the learned Counsel submitted that the aforesaid decision squarely applies in the facts and the circumstances of the instant case, inasmuch, as the pasties in both the litigations are same, subject-matter of the suit was also the same and point of law is also common, inasmuch as it has to be considered in the instant application that whether in both the suits, the order passed for staying the further proceedings in the Eviction Suit in exercise of its power under Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply.

7. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party submitted that the facts in the case of Dr. N.P. Tripathi (supra) are not similar to the facts of the instant case, since in the present case the plaintiff