The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court must strictly adhere to the limitation period prescribed under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and failure to do so renders the order taking cognizance of the offence illegal and without jurisdiction.

Chy.S.N.Mishra, J.

1. Thepetitioners, in this application, have challenged the order taking cognizance dated 5.4.1995 of an offence punishable under Sections 3/4 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 including the order dated 27.9.1995 by which the trial Court was refused to drop the proceeding on the ground mentioned in the order itself. The petitioners had earlier filed a quashing application challenging the order taking cognizance of the alleged offence which was subsequently withdrawn with a direction to raise the question before the trial Court which shall be considered in accordance with law. Pursuant thereto, petitioners filed a petition before the trial Court praying therein to drop the proceeding on the ground that the very initiation of the proceeding is barred by limitation in terms of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (herein after referred to as the Code) which has been rejected by the trial Court.

2. Learned counsel submits the very order taking cognizance of the alleged offence is barred by limitation in as much as, the learned Magistrate without condoning the delay in terms of Section 473 of the Code passed the impugned order. Admittedly, the first information report was lodged on 20.1.1991 the charge-sheet, after investigation, was submitted on 16.2.1995 and the cognizance of the offence was taken on 5.4.1995. The offence is punishable with imprisonment upto 3 years and as such the cognizance is to be taken within three years from the date of the occurrence. Admittedly cognizance was taken beyond period prescribed under Section 468 of the Code. Learned counsel submits that since the very order taking cognizance is barred under the statute and, as such, all subsequent orders, pursuant thereto, are wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. In order to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel Section 468 which bars the Court to take cognizance of the alleged offence after the expiry of the period of limitation reads thus :

(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be (a) six months, if any offence is punishable with fine only;

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

3. The provision as quoted above not only prescribes the bar of limitation but also prohibits the Magistrate from taking cognizance of the offence. The object of the Code in prescribing the limitation of initiating criminal prosecution is to prevent the parties from filing case beyond the period prescribed under the statute. The object of the Code is in consonance with the fairness of the trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, it is incumbent upon the parties to proceed strictly in accordance with the command as envisaged in Section 468 of the Code. I am supported by a decision in the case of Surinder Mohan Vikal V/s. Ascharj Lal Chopra, AIR 1978 SC 986. Similar is the view taken in the case of State of Punjab V/s. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054. It is true that under Section 473 of the Code the Magistrate is vested with the power to condone the delay but mere perusal of order under challenge, it appears that neither the Magistrate, while taking cognizance, nor the trial Court has considered this aspect of the matter except stating that the Magistrate while taking cognizance of the alleged offence, must have condoned the delay. As stated above, the learned Magistrate without condoning the delay, has passed the order. In the premises, it would thus appear that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the provision which prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of the offence in t