S.N.Pathak, J.

1. The aforesaid three revisions were heard analogous and so this common judgment is being passed. The revisionist was convicted for offences under Section 120B read with Section 420, 465 and 468 I.P.C. and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. He was, however, sentenced to remain in court custody till the rising of the court.

2. It was submitted by the revisionists lawyer that the revisionist was charged for entering into a conspiracy to cheat the Government of Rs. 75,643.20 by passing a bill for the aforesaid amount on account of supply of electric main switches to Gaya Sub-division of Bhagalpur Electric Works Division during the period April 1965 to April 1966. But, however, as Divisional Accountant posted at Bhagalpur, his business was only to verify and check the bills on the basis of measurement book and other certificates authenticated under the signature of concerned Engineers posted at Gaya where main switches had been supplied. So his official duty of checking and passing bills was based on the certificates issued by the concerned authority of Gaya and he was not required to make physical verification whether actual supply of the concerned electric materials was made. So there was no question of his being in league with other officials of the Electric Works Division or officials of Sub-division at Gaya or Dhanbad or anywhere else. So his conviction was based on insufficient evidence regarding conspiracy or regarding preparation of false bills or regarding cheating and defrauding the Government of its money and securing any benefit for himself on account of the alleged offence. The order of conviction was further assailed by the revisionists lawyer on the ground that in the first place, evidence adduced in one case was used in the other cases and sanction for prosecution was also accorded by the Accountant General, Bihar, even though the revisionist was an employee of Public Works Department.

3. I shall first examine the contentions of the revisionists lawyer regarding evidence of one case being used in the other case. In this connection, the judgment of the trial court dated 29th January 2000, is relevant for consideration. I find that four cases, i.e., Special Case Nos. 6/75, 7/75, 8/75 and 9/75 were split up from one R. C. No. 6 of 1969 submitted by the C.B.I. So it is apparent that there was a common F.l.R. and a common charge-sheet was submitted from which four cases were split up. The judgment further shows that common evidence was adduced (oral and documentary) for all four cases as the offence was of the same kind and documents or oral evidence was also common. From the aforesaid facts, it is apparent that common evidence was led for all the four cases. So the argument that the evidence of one case was used in the other case does not appear to be tenable. When common evidence as led for all four cases which had been split up from a common F.I.R. I am of the opinion that it was not the case of evidence of one case being used in another case; rather the evidence led was common for all the cases. So the trial did not vitiate nor did it cause any prejudice to the accused- revisionist nor he was misled in his evidence. Section 465 Cr. P. C. can be taken in aid to meet this technical objection of the revisionists lawyer wherein it has been laid down as under:

"........No judgment or other proceedings before or during trial of any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code......unless, in the opinion of the Court, failure of justice has, in fact, been occasioned thereby."

Sub-section (2) of Section 465 Cr. P. C. has also laid down : "......Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an early stage in the proceedings".

Apparently, no objection was raised at the initial stage when common evidence was being led for all these four cases and when those cases were split up. So it does not appear that any