2003 Supreme(Pat) 1080
PATNA HIGH COURT
Sachchidanand Jha, R.M.Prasad and Shiva Kirti Singh JJ.
Larley
Versus
John @ Johny C.A.
Matrimonial Reference No. 1 of 1998 ;
Decided On : OCTOBER 10,2003
Headnote:Interpretation of Statutes-It is well settled rule of interpretation that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect-While amendment in procedural law has a retrospective operation any amendment affecting vested rights takes effect prospectively unless there are words in the Statute sufficient to show that the intention of the legislature was to affect the existing rights. (Para 4)
Indian Divorce Act, 1869-Sections 17 and 20 [Now stood omitted by Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act 2001-Confirmation of decree of nullity of marriage by High Court-Confirmation of decree is not an empty formality or a routine affair-Section 17 creates right in favour of unsuccessful party to object to confirmation of the decree-There is nothing in the amendment to suggest that the legislature intended it to be retrospective-Any amendment in the appeal provision has to be held to be prospective unless otherwise provided-A fortiori any amendment in the confirmation provision must also be held to be prospective unless otherwise provided in the amendment-Deletion of section 20 has no bearing on a decree which was pending before High Court for confirmation at the time of its deletion. (Paras 6 to 9)
AIR 1957 SC 540; AIR 1960 SC 980; AIR 1975 SC 1843-Relied upon.
S.N.JHA, J.
1. This is a reference under Sec. 20 read with Sec. 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (the Act for short). Sec. 20 as it stood prior to the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act 50 of 2001) provided that every decree or nullity of marriage made by District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court, and the provisions of Sec. 17, Clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4), shall mutatis mutandis apply to such decrees. I shall refer to Sec. 17 of the Act a little later in this judgment. The petitioner instituted suit being Matrimonial Case No. 38 of 1996 in the Court of District Judge, Bhagalpur for decree of nullity of marriage with respondent on the ground that the respondent was an idiot at the time of marriage. The Second Additional District Judge, Bhagalpur to whom the case was transferred, accepting the petitioners case granted her decree of nullity of marriage subject to confirmation by the High Court under Sec. 20 of the Act. That is how the matter has come to this Court. ;
2. Notice of the reference was issued to the parties pursuant to which the petitioner entered appearance. The respondent however, chose not to appear as in the Court below. The case was accordingly listed for ex parte hearing. In the meantime the petitioner had filed an application (IA No. 1070/ 2003) stating that during the pendency of the reference, Sec. 20 of the Act was omitted by the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, referred to above, and therefore, there is no requirement of confirmation of the decree passed by the Court below, and in the circumstances, the reference has become redundant and infructuous. The matter was heard on 14-7-2003. .
3. I shall first consider the question as to whether by reason of the amendment omitting Sec. 20 from the Act, the reference has become infructuous. In other words, whether the decree passed by the Court below has attained finality without requiring confirmation by this Court. The question as to the effect of the Amendment deleting Sec. 20 of the Act involves the question as to whether the amendment is prospective or retrospective. It is to be mentioned here that deletion of Sec. 20 is without any saving clause.
4. It is well settled rule of interpretation that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. It is also well settled that while amendment in procedural law has a retrospective operation, any amendment affecting vested rights takes effect prospectively unless there are words in the Statute sufficient to show that the intention of the legislature, was to affect the existing rights. The point which arises for consideration is whether the amendment in question brings about change in the procedural law or affects the vested right of the parties.
5. At this stage Sec. 17 of the Act so far as relevant, may be quoted as under :
"17. Confirmation of decree for dissolution by District Judge. Every decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. The High Court, if it think further enquiry or additional evidence to be necessary, may direct such enquiry to be made or such evidence to be taken. The result of such enquiry and the additional evidence shall be certified to the High Court by the District Judge, and the High Court shall thereupon make an order confirming the decree for dissolution of marriage, or such other order as to the Court seems fit. Provided that ................"
It is relevant to mention here that a new Sec. 17 has been substituted in place of the earlier one quoted above, by the abovesaid amendment.
6 From reading of the above provisions (as they stood) it is evident that confirmation of decree is not an empty formality or a routine affair. The High Court in the facts and circumstances of the particular case may get further enquiry made or evidence taken and thereafter either confirm the deree, or pass such other order a