Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J.

1. Petitioner was a constable in the Border Security Force. A Summary Security Force Court was held on the purported allegation that he had committed the offence of theft of 29 rounds of ammunition. The Summary Security Force Court, hereinafter referred to as the Court, held the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months in a civil prison and to be dismissed from service. The petitioner was communicated the order by the Commandant on 20-2-2001. The Court was held at the Headquarter of the Border Security Force (for short Force) at Kupwara in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The Deputy Inspector General of the Force in exercise of his power under Rule 161 of the B.S.F. Rules, 1969, remitted the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months in civil prison but maintained the order of dismissal from service. Said order of the Deputy Inspector General of the Force was promulgated to the petitioner on 14th of May, 2001. It seems that against the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred statutory petition and by order dated 22nd of January, 2002 (Annexure-16), petitioner was informed that his statutory petition has been rejected by the Director General of the Force.

2. Mr. Rakesh Kumar, appearing on behalf of the respondents raises a preliminary objection in regard to the maintainability of this writ petition before this Court. He points out that the Court was held at Kupwara in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, where the punishment was imposed and, in fact, same was promulgated to the petitioner there. In this connection, Shri Kumar has drawn my attention to the Promulgation Certificate dated 20th of February, 2001 in which the Commandant has stated that the finding and sentence of the Court were promulgated to the petitioner at Kupwara. Mr. Kumar further draws my attention to the next Promulgation Certificate dated 14th of May, 2001 showing that the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of the Force remitting the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of six months in civil prison was also promulgated at Kupwara. Mr. Kumar submits that the sentence awarded to the petitioner having been promulgated at the place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. In support of his submission, learned Counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nawal Kishore Singh V/s. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1983 BBCJ 23 and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from para 11 of the judgment which reads as follows:

"11. Examining the facts of the present case however, it is clear the consequence of the order of dismissal of the petitioner and his removal from the service took place at Naya Nangal itself and the petitioner when returned to his village home, came as dismissed employee, having no claim whatsoever in the service except a right to prefer an appeal. Simply, therefore, the filing of an appeal from his village home where the petitioner might have chosen to proceed after his dismissal in our opinion did not or should not furnish any part of the cause of action to clothe the High Court of that place the territorial jurisdiction to exercise any of the powers under Clause (1) of Art. 226. Such a view in our considered opinion appears quite reasonable and proper. As otherwise it would expose the authority or a Government to the vagaries of a disgruntled employee to compel them to defend the action that he may choose to bring at a place far away from its seat or place of residence. Such an interpretation in our opinion instead of serving the intention and spirit of Clause (2) of Art. 226 may lead to great injustice and hardship to them. Be that as it may we feel our inability to accept the contention that the act of merely filing an appeal against an adverse order, which has been already carried out, should be deemed to be a part of the cau