1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned junior counsel to Standing Counsel (Ceiling).

2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 15.2.2003 (Annexure 11), passed by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna, in Case No. 42 of 1999 (Sunil Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Ors.), whereby he has rejected the revision application of the petitioners under Section 32 of the Land Ceiling Act on the ground that the final order has already been passed by the Collector.

3. On a perusal of the impugned order and consideration of the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, it appears to me that the learned Additional Member has committed errors apparent on the face of the record by assigning a restricted and narrow scope of jurisdiction under Section 32 of the Act, and, secondly, by establishing parity between Sections 32 and 45B of the Act. The scope and content of the two provisions are fundamentally different. The scope of Section 32 fell for the consideration of this Court in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Ors., the judgment of which has since been summarily reported in 1986 PLJR NOC (AB)23 (Kamleshwar Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar), (the full text whereof is reported in 1986 Bihar Revenue & Labour Journal Page 1), wherein a Division Bench of this Court held that the Board of Revenue under Section 32 of the Act is not a court merely to correct errors of law or jurisdiction, or failure to exercise jurisdiction or material irregularity, but is instead a forum of unlimited appeal. Section 32 does not imply other well known limitations in the revisionai jurisdiction which are with regard to only legality or propriety of the orders of the Court in the cases under Section 397 Cr. P.C. In other words, the Division Bench in substance laid down that the limitations on the powers of the revisionai courts under Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code stand on a fundamentally different footing which are very narrow and restricted in contradistinction to the revisionai powers under Section 38 of the Act which is a forum of unlimited appeal. The confusion has arisen because of the use of the expression revision in Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and Section 32 of the Land Ceiling Act. The language in which the first two provisions are couched are fundamentally different from that of Section 32 of the Act which has brought about the entire difference. It is now well settled that the legislature has not intended to assign narrow and restricted jurisdiction under Sec. 32 of the Act which is a court of facts and is a forum of unlimited appeal. The aforesaid judgment was followed by another Division Bench in its judgment summarily reported in 1987 PLJR NOC (A) P.1. (Jagarnath Sah vs. Pannalal Mahto & Ors.), and the full text whereof is reported in 1987 Bihar Law Judgments P. 500. In that view of the matter, it is incumbent on the Board of Revenue, while exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 32 of the Act, to act as a forum of facts, one of unlimited appeal, and has to examine all issues of facts and law.

4. As to the second error apparent on the face of the record is concerned, a revision application under Section 32 of the Act is the last forum under the Act to test the correctness of the action taken under the Act, either land ceiling proceedings or pre-emption applications, and are available to the aggrieved person as a matter of right and before the proceedings finally come to a close. On the other hand, the provisions of Section 45B of the Act can be invoked after the entire land ceiling proceeding under the Act has come to a close and the remedies upto the provisional stage have either been exhausted or no longer available by efflux of time, to correct manifest errors to prevent mis-carriage of justice, is narrow in its sweep and scope, and is discretionary with the prescribed authority. This is an