The main legal point established in the judgment is that the non-obstante clause in sec. 100-A of the Code bars further appeal from the judgment and decree of a single Judge of a High Court.

Nagendra Rai, J.

1. The maintainability matter of the appeal has been placed for orders.

2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. This appeal is directed against the order dated 15.7.2004, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court allowing the appeal filed by the respondents against the order dated 24.6.1999, passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Vaishali at Hajipur, in Probate Case No. 32 of 1966 recalling his earlier order of substitution dated 9.12.1975.

3. According to the office note, the appeal is not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in sec. 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code).

4. The matter arises out of a probate case, where the appellant was an objector. In the probate case, on 9.12.1975, the Court below expunged the name of the sole applicant Ram Bakshis Singh, who died on 15.7.1975 and substituted his heirs, who claimed to be legatees under the registered Will in question. The objector filed an application for recalling the said order, which was done by the impugned order in appeal before the learned single Judge.

5. The appeal was filed u/s. 299 of the Indian Succession Act (for short the Act), which runs as follows :-

"299. Appeals from orders of District Judge.-Every order made by a District Judge by virtue of the powers hereby conferred upon him shall be subject to appeal to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals."

6. sec. 100-A of the Code brought by way of recent amendment runs as follows :-

"100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge."

Thus, according to the amended provisions of the Code, in case an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrumerit having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force. As stated above, the appeal was filed u/s. 299 of the Act.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his submission and submitted that as the appeal was filed u/s. 229 of the Act and not under the Code and the provision of the Act does not prevent filing of further appeal, the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable inspite of insertion of sec. 100-A of the Code by the new amendment :-

(i) Vanita M. Khanolkary. Pragna M. Pal, AIR 1998 SC 424.

(ii) Chandra Kanta Sinha V/s. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2001 (3) PLJR 167 (SC).

(iii) Sharda Devi V/s. State of Bihar, 2002 (2) PLJR 168 (SC);

(iv) Subal Pual V/s. Malina Paul, 2003 (3) PLJR (SC).

8. Thus, the only question for consideration is as to whether an appeal is maintainable or not in view of the newly added provision of sec. 100-A of the Code.

9. In case of Vanita M. Khanolkar, (supra), which was a judgment rendered by two Hon ble Judges of the Apex Court, the question for consideration was whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge under original jurisdiction under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act was appealable before a Division Bench under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court or not. Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act clearly bars any appeal or revision against any order passed by the Court u/s. 6 of the said Act. Dealing with the said matter, the Apex Court held that the statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Unless the concerned statutory