The main legal point established in the judgment is that under Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.

1. Heard learned counsel for the sole petitioner and learned counsel for the Opposite Parties.

2. This Civil Revision has been filed on behalf of the defendant challenging order dated 2.7.2005 by which the learned Subordinate Judge 7th, Siwan rejected his petition regarding non-maintainability of the suit due to bar imposed under Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code for the sake, of brevity) in Title Suit No. 48 of 2002.

3. The aforesaid suit was filed by the sole original plaintiff-Opposite Party for declaration that the compromise decree dated 18.1.2000 passed in Title Suit No. 331 of 1994 was illegal, without any basis, frivolous and prayed to set aside the same and pass an order of injunction against the defendants.

4. The said Title Suit No. 331 of 1994 was filed by the petitioner against the Opposite Party for specific performance of contract in which a compromise petition was filed on 15.4.1996 with signatures of both the parties whereafter the said suit was decreed on 18.1.2000 on the basis of the said compromise. Much thereafter Title Suit No. 48 of 2002 was filed by the opposite party for declaration that the aforesaid compromise decree in Title Suit No. 331 of 1994 was illegal and to set aside the same claiming that the Opposite Party had neither appeared in the earlier Title Suit No. 331 of 1994 nor he had engaged any advocate nor had filed any Vakalatnama and the entire procedure was a fraud upon him by the petitioner.

5. In Title Suit No. 48 of 2002 the petitioner who was a defendant filed a petition on 30.7.2003 claiming that the suit is not maintainable in view of the specific bar provided under Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code according to which no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. To the said petition a rejoinder was filed by the Opposite Party stating that he had never appeared in the suit nor participated in the alleged compromise and hence he was fully justified in filing the aforesaid suit for the reliefs claimed therein. The learned court below dismissed the petition of the defendant-petitioner on the ground that issue has already been settled for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties and it was expedient to adjudicate the said issue alongwith preliminary issue raised by the defendant.

6. On the basis of the averments made by the parties and the materials on record, it is quite apparent that the real question in issue in the instant suit is as to whether the compromise on the basis of which the decree in the earlier suit was passed was lawful. The law is well settled in that regard as Or. 23 R. 3A of the Code specifically provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. Furthermore, a Division Bench of this Court in case of Guru Charan Singh & Ors. V/s. Mahatam Singh & Anr., 2006 3 PLJR 345 has specifically held that if a decree is passed on the basis of any compromise and in view of the provisions referred to above the only remedy open to plaintiff for challenging the said decree is to prefer an appeal under Section 96 of the Code, and not by a suit which was not maintainable. The Division Bench of this Court specifically referred to paragraph 9 of the decision of the Hon ble Apex Court in case of Banwari Lal V/s. Smt. Chando Devi and Another, 1993 1 PLJR 21 which is as follows:

"Section 96(3) of the Code says that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. Rule 1A(2) has been introduced saying that against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded. When Section 96(3) bars an appeal against decree passed with the consent of parties, it implies that such decree is valid and