1. Petitioner has preferred this revision application, aggrieved by the order dated 20.5.2006 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Vaishali at Hajipur in Case No. CII(A)39 of 1995, whereby the application filed by the petitioner for discharge has been rejected.

2. The Stamp Reporter objected to the maintainability of the revision application under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it opined that an application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be maintainable. However, no reason was assigned in support of the said report.

3. By order dated 26.6.2006, I called for further report. In pursuance of the said order, Stamp Reporter has submitted its report alongwith the opinion of the Registrar (List & Computer). It is their stand that rejection of a petition for discharge is not a final order because the case has not been disposed of and hence the order being interlocutory in nature, revision is not maintainable. In support of aforesaid, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V.C. Shukla-appellant vs. State through C.B.I.-respondent reported in A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 962.

4. The stand taken by Stamp Reporter as endorsed by the Registrar (List & Computer) is absolutely erroneous and the reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of V.C. Shukla- appellant vs. State through, C.B.I.-respondent (supra) is absolutely misconceived.

5. The Stamp Reporter proceeded on a wrong assumption that what is not final is interlocutory. It is well settled that the expression interlocutory order in Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be liberally construed. In my opinion, an order deciding the right of the party substantially is not an interlocutory order, although it may not decide the case finally. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath and Othersappellants vs. State of Haryana and Another-respondents reported in A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 2185, wherein it has been held as follows:

"It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Websters New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Sec. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad pr artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Sec. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, call for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Sec. 397(2) of the 1973 Code."

6. Further in the case of Madhu Limaye-appellant vs. State of Maharashtra-respondent reported in A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court page-47, in which it has been held as follows:

"Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-s. (2) of Sec. 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Art. 134 of the Constitution, yet would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of S. 397(2