The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and potential implications of Rule 20 of the Bihar Panchayat Elementary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006, particularly in relation to the acquisition of status and continuance up to the age of 60 years with higher emoluments for individuals appointed under the policy decision.

1. Heard Mr. Tej Bahadur Singh for the petitioner, and Mr. Lalit Kishore, learned Additional Advocate General No. Ill for the respondents. Mr. Chittaranjan Sinha has also been heard on behalf of the petitioner in the analogous C.W.J.C. No. 10113 of 2007.

2. The learned Additional Advocate General raises a preliminary objection that, in view of the provisions of Rule 18, read with Rule 20(i) of the Bihar Panchayat Elementary Teachers (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the 2006 Rules), the writ petition at the instance of the aggrieved persons has become infructuous, inter alia, for the reason that they were applicants for Shiksha Mitra under the quondam policy decision which stands repealed in terms of Rule 20(i) of the 2006 Rules. He further submits that, in view of the provisions of Rule 20(iii), the successful candidates who were appointed Shiksha Mitra under the policy decision have under the 2006 Rules acquired status and may continue upto the age of sixty years with raised emoluments.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit in opposition that the interpretation put by the learned Additional Advocate General on the provisions of the relevant provisions will render the aggrieved persons remedyless and will produce the pernicious and unintended effect of perpetuating an illegality. In other words, persons who were illegally appointed as Shiksha Mitra on or before 31.6.2006 shall acquire status in terms of Rule 20(iii).

4. One more aspect of the matter needs consideration. It appears that Rule 20(iii) reproduced hereinbelow is very widely worded:

A person validly or invalidly appointed under the policy decision for a period of 11 months shall, by this provision, acquire status, will continue upto 60 years of age, with higher emoluments. The selection process may be different. Is it not a possible situation that many may not have felt interested in applying under the policy decision because of the poor terms and conditions with the uncertainty attendant on it, whereas many more may be interested in applying under the 2006 Rules because of superior terms and conditions including status and continuance upto the age of 60 years. This prima facie appears to be arbi trary, discriminatory and ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

5. There is yet another aspect of the matter which needs consideration, namely, which of the aggrieved persons, if permitted to challenge the allegedly illegal appointment of the selected candidates, can be permitted to do so. Perhaps only those of the aggrieved persons can challenge whose right to sue survived on 1.7.2006. To illustrate this point, if a person under the policy decision was appointed for a period of 11 months. Before his turn for extension for a further period of 11 months arose, the State Government modified the earlier policy decision by Government Resolution No. 1458, dated 11.8.2004, whereby the minimum educational qualification was enhanced to Intermediate with a minimum of 45 per cent marks. Such an incumbent in those of the cases who did not have the raised qualification would automatically be disqualified for extension and, therefore, his right to sue did not survive on 1.7.2006.

6. In view of the importance of the matter, which affects every Panchayat of this sprawling State, and also in view of the position that the vires of Clause (iii) of Rule 20 is in question, I refer this matter for the consideration of a Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

7. Elaborate submissions were advanced before me by learned counsel for the parties. I have hereinabove indicated only some of them to indicate the importance of the matter and the justification for its reference to a Division Bench. It goes without saying that it will be open to the parties to raise further submissions available to them in law, before the Division Bench.

8. A large number of matters are pending in this Court as well as before the concerned