The main legal point established in the judgment is that there is no statutory requirement for the court to hear the petitioner's counsel for the disposal of a bail application on merits, and the court has the jurisdiction to decide the bail application in the absence of the petitioner's counsel.

Mihir Kr.Jha, J.

1. Heard Mr. Bindhyakeshri Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the State.

2. In this application the petitioner has made a prayer for grant of regular bail in connection with Laukhi P.S. Case No. 108 of 2007, lodged under Sections 147, 148, 302, 120B and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

3. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner had submitted that earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was dismissed by this Court by an order dated 18.6.2008 in Cr. Misc. No. 1177 of 2008 on merits but without hearing the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and as such this Court would be required to once again go into merits of the case. Sri Kumar, learned Senior Counsel has in this context also taken a firm stand that this Court had committed error of procedure in disposing of the earlier bail application of the petitioner on merits even when the earlier counsel for the petitioner had not appeared and argued the case on merits. He is also of the view that this Court in absence of counsel for the petitioner ought to have dismissed the application for default but in no event on merts. In this regard he has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the caseof Kawleshwar Singh & Anr. vs. Raghubir Singh & Ors., reported in AIR 1961 Patna 299 and also in the case of Kishori Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2008(2) PLJR 458.

4. Turning to the merits, learned senior Counsel had also been submitted that the co-accused Manoj Yadav and Pramod Yadav having identical allegations were subsequently granted regular bail on 12.1.2009 and 28.5.2009 in Cr. Misc. No. 41581 of 2008 and Cr. Misc. No. 3290 of 2009 respectively after rejection of prayer for bail of the petitioner on 18.6.2008 and thus in view of the aforesaid fresh material this Court should reconsider the matter for grant of regular bail to the petitioner on merits.

5. It had also been submitted by him that as the case diary was not called for and looked into earlier while dismissing the bail petition of the petitioner on merit on 18.6.2008 the same has resulted into committing an error of record in holding the petitioner causing firearm injury whereas in the post mortem report there is no firearm injury on the person of the deceased, and the doctor conducting the post mortem had found only bruises over the person of the deceased. He has therefore contended that this Court should also call for the case diary before reconsidering the prayer of the petitioner for grant of regular bail on merits.

6. Learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, had submitted that once prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected on merits there would be no occasion for this Court to reconsider the prayer for bail again on merits and if the petitioner was so aggrieved he could have gone in appeal to the Apex Court against the earlier order of this Court. It was also submitted that the case of the petitioner in fact stands on a different footing as against other co-accused persons who have been subsequently granted regular bail by this Court after rejection of the prayer of the petitioner.

7. Learned Counsel for the State in this regard has also submitted that it was not correct on the part of learned counsel for the petitioner to say that on earlier occasion the prayer for bail was rejected on merit on 18.6.2008 without looking into case diary. He has also sought to repel the other submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner by taking a categorical stand that there is no procedural law which prohibits this Court to decide the case for grant of bail on merits in case of non-appearance of the counsel for the petitioners and the two cases relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner being not related to the grant of bail are completely distinguishable.

8. In view of aforementioned submissions, the first and foremost question which would arise for adjudication is as to whether t