1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 1 and 3(ii) to 3(iv).

2. The application has been filed for restoration of Civil Revision No. 872 of 2005 which stood dismissed for non-compliance of the peremptory order dated 2.7.2007 of this Court. By the aforesaid order this Court had granted two weeks time to learned counsel for the petitioners to comply with the first part of the order dated 30.3.2007 of the Lawazima Board, i.e., for filing an affidavit of jointness of opposite party Nos.3(i) & 3(H) with opposite party No.3(iii) within a period of four weeks from that date. Since the said order was not complied with within the peremptory time granted, the Civil Revision Application stood rejected in terms of the peremptory order. Accordingly, the present application for restoration has been filed.

3. Learned counsel for the appearing opposite parties submits that the restoration application has been filed beyond the period of limitation as provided by Article 122 of the Limitation Act and thus the same should be dismissed as barred by limitation. In support of the same he relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Radhanath Pathak and another Vs. Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, Patna :A!R 1968 Patna 110.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, submits that an order of the present nature granting peremptory time for filing of jointness affidavit cannot be considered as an order passed in any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus it would not be governed by Article 122 of the Limitation Act as held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mrs. Minnie Lal Vs. Mahadeo Lall Marwari and others :AIR 1949 Patna 112, which, in turn, has held the same relying upon a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Khelawan Singh Vs. Moni Lal Sahu:AIR 1939 Patna 678.

5. It is urged by learned counsel that the said decisions clearly laid down that orders of the present nature are not governed by Article 168 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which was in similar terms as Article 122 of the present Limitation Act. In paragraph-2 of Mrs.Minnie Lal case it has been observed as follows :

"2. Mr.U.N.Sinha, on behalf of the opposite party, has urged that the petition is barred by limitation, having been filed beyond the period prescribed in Art. 168 in Sch.1, Limitation Act, 1908 . He points out that this article refers in general terms to an application "for the readmission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution," and relies for his contention on a decision of a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court reported in S.A.Ganny Vs. I.M.Russell, 8 Rang. 380: (A.I.R.(17) 1930 Rang. 228 F.B.). That decision is distinguishable on the facts because, as was pointed out by Carr J. at pp.232 and 233 of the report, the application for re-admission in that case was filed under 0.52, Civil P.C., as then in force in Burma. Far from supporting Mr.U.N.Sinha, that case supports the view that Art. 168 has no application to the case before us-I refer to the passage in the judgment of Page C.J.at p. 231, where he cites Srimati Lakhimoni Dassi Vs. Dwijendra Nath, 23 C.W.N. 473: (A.I.R. (6) 1919 Cal. 345), Wadia Gandhy & Co. Vs. Purshottum, 32 Bom. 1 (9 Bom. L.R.508) and Raja Narendra Lal Khan Vs. Taru Bala Dassi, 25 C.W.N. 800 : (A.I.R. (8) 1921 Cal. 67) as authorities for the proposition that "Art. 168 would apply only to applications to readmit appeals dismissed for want, of prosecution as provided or contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure."

The same view was expressed by Carr J. at p. 391:

"I think that it must be held, on authority, that the articles in the Third Division of Sch. 1 to the Limitation Act apply only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, and applications ejusdem generis." In the present case, I do not think it necessary to examine the cases cited above and the other reported cases, going back to