The significance of the date of occurrence in determining juvenility and the obligation of the State Government to review the case of individuals claiming juvenility under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.

By the Court.-The two petitioners in this writ petition were convicted of an offence under Section 302, IPC which they have committed on 9.9.1992. The judgment of the Sessions Court was rendered on 26.11.1994. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. They appealed to the High Court, and the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed their appeal by judgment dated 3.8.2011 against which, they preferred Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7061 of 2001 unsuccessfully. Thus the judgment of conviction and sentence as awarded on 26.11.1994 by the trial Court stood affirmed up to the Apex Court.

2. It may be noticed here that when the offence was alleged to have been committed, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force. Here, juvenile was defined by Section 2 (h) to mean a boy who has not attained the age of 16 years. Here, it may also be noticed that plea of juvenility of either of the two petitioners was not raised either before the trial Court or before the High Court in appeal or before the Supreme Court in appeal.

3. The said Act of 1986 was then repealed and replaced by Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Here, "Juvenile" was defined by Section 2(k) to mean a person who has not completed 18 years of age. Thus, it would be seen that with effect from 1st April, 2001 when the Act of 2000 came into effect, the earlier age of a juvenile boy was increased from 16 to 18 years. Petitioner No.1 claims to have been born on 10.10.1976 and petitioner No.2 on 28.8.1975. This would make petitioner No. 1 less than 16 years of age on the date of occurrence and petitioner No.2 slightly more than 17 years of age.

4. Mr. Bakshi S.R.P. Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in support of this Criminal writ application submits that as the petitioners were juvenile in conflict with law within the meaning of the Act of 2000, upon introduction of Section 7 -A to the said Act with effect from 2006, they had to be given the benefit of juvenility in terms of Section 20 of the said Act. On the day when their S.L.P. (Cr.) was dismissed by the Apex Court, the Act of 2000 had been enforced and their appeal was pending, unfortunately, the petitioners could not take the plea at that time.

5. After coming into force of Section 7-A of the said Act, they filed a writ petition before this Court, being Cr. W.J.C. No. 15 of 2010, which was disposed of on 4.2.2010 (Annexure-1), giving liberty to the petitioners to move appropriate forum, as determining the question of age involved disputed question of fact. Petitioners, then, moved the trial Court. The trial Court by its order dated 3.11.2010 (Annexure-5), noticing that the petitioners had produced certificate granted by the Bihar State Madarsa Board and the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna, noticed the date of birth of the two petitioners and being prima facie satisfied that the two petitioners were juvenile within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, referred the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board. Nawada, The matter having been received by the Juvenile Justice Board, the Juvenile Justice Board by order dated 29.1.2011 (Annexure-6) declined to go into the question on the ground that there was no appeal, revision, etc pending and, as such, it would not exercise its jurisdiction in this matter.

6. By this writ petition, petitioners have challenged their continued detention in regards to serving out the life imprisonment on the ground that they were juvenile in conflict with law and, as such, could not be sentenced to life imprisonment.

7. In our view, the writ petition for the relief as prayed for is mis-conceived. We may point out that the plea of the learned senior counsel that by virtue of Section 7-A and in particular the proviso to sub-section (1) does not give right to the petitioners to move this writ petition.

8. For better appreciation, we may quote Section