The petitioner has been detained in preventive custody under Section 12 (2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981 (in short, the Act) by the District Magistrate, Begusarai vide order N. 725/L dated 5..2002. The detention has been confirmed by the State Government in terms of Section 21 (1) read with Section 22 of the Act vide order No. 6091 dated 1.6.2002 of the Home (Police) Department. In between, the detention had been approved by the Government in terms of Section 12 (3) of the Act on 13.4.2002. The petitioner seeks quashing of the said orders and his release from detention.

2. Shri Pramod Manbansh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has been detained in view of certain acts allegedly committed by him as mentioned in the grounds of detention but the incidents referred to therein, even on their face value, are not likely to affect public order. These acts were directed against individuals and at best may constitute breach of law and order without disrupting maintenance of public order and as such the impugned detention must be set aside beyond the scope of preventive detention under the Act.

3. Before examining the contention of the counsel, it would be worth mentioning that four incidents have been sited in the ground of detention as petitioner's antecedents and similarly four incidents have been mentioned constituting the grounds. All the incidents took place in a span of little over three years between 22.11.98 and 3.1.2002 giving rise to substantive cases of like nature. The petitioner as alleged, along with his associates, to have committed assault on different persons, taking, away/extorting money from them or criminally intimidating them. In some incidents he is alleged to have used fire arms for the purpose. In Gulab Mehra Vs. State of U.P. and others. AIR 1987 SC 2332, the Supreme Court observed that whether an act amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach of public order depends on its extent and reach to the society. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of the public order. The acts of assault, intimidating, snatching away/extorting money in public view cannot be said to be such the impact of which would be restricted to the victims alone. In all likelihood they affect the even tempo of the life of the community as such acts create sense of fear in the mind of the public at large. So far the instant case is concerned it is to be kept in mind that the petitioner has been allegedly committing similar act at regular intervals since 1998 and, therefore, prima - facie he would come within the mischief of the term 'anti - social element' under Section 2 (d) of the Act.

4. It need hardly be emphasised that the preventive detention of a person is the result of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and while making judicial review of the order the High Court is not supposed to weigh the materials, as if sitting in appeal, and go into the question of satisfaction. Nevertheless, perusal of the details of the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention leaves little room for doubt that there was sufficient basis for the detaining authority to arrive at a satisfaction. Clearly, the fall out of the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner was enough to affect the even flow of life and community at large and, it cannot be said that the allegations levelled against the petitioner remained in realm of beach of law and order and not breach of public order. The contention of the counsel is accordingly rejected.

5. Counsel then submitted that there has been breach of the provisions of Section 19 of the Act as the State Government failed to refer the petitioner's case to the Advisory Board within the stipulated period of three weeks. Counsel