P.K. SINHA, J.:- Respondent Chhatrapal Singh, while working as Head-Clerk in Mairwa Notified Area Committee was .proceeded against departmentally and, on the basis of the enquiry report, was dismissed from service. He filed Title Suit No.98 of 1977 in the Court of Second Munsif at Siwan. admittedly without serving notice under section 377 of the Bihar & Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 (referred to as the "Act", in short), in which the learned Munsif while holding that the dismissal of the plaintiff (Chhatrapal Singh) was illegal, dismissed the suit on the sole ground that notice under section 377 of the Act was not served.

2. The Plaintiff, Chhatrapal Singh, preferred Title Appeal No. 24/2 of 1981/82, which was decided by the First Additional District Judge who allowed the appeal and decreed the suit holding that in a case of such nature, service of notice under section 377 of the Act was not sine qua non for the maintainability of the suit and that the suit was maintainable without such notice. The First Appellate Court also mentioned in the judgment that it did not differ with the conclusions of the trial court with respect to the findings which had gone in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, did not give its own reasons on those issues.

3. In this Second Appeal, two substantial questions of law have been formulated, viz.

(a) Whether the Learned Additional District Judge was right in not examining the correctness of the findings of the trial court recorded against the appellants in absence of a cross appeal, and

(b) Whether the suit is maintainable in absence of service of notice under section 377 of the Act?

This matter then came up for hearing before S.Ali Ahmad, J and his lordship, by order dated 6.4.1989, referred the appeal before a Division Bench also noting disagreement with a decision by a single Judge of this court, relied upon by the appellant, in case of Harihar Tiwary Vs. Commissioner, Monghyr Municipality (1985 PLJR 88)(Noc). This is how this appeal has come up for decision before us.

4. In so far as the first point is concerned, the learned lower appellate court in its judgment, after mentioning issues framed by the trial court, the case of the parties and how those issues were decided, also noted that no cross-objections had been preferred by the respondents against the findings of the trial court in favour of the plaintiff. The learned lower appellate court in para 11 of the judgment, as already stated, expressed its agreement with those findings of the trial court and noted in paragraph 12 of the judgment that the only point that was pressed before it by both the parties was whether the suit was rightly dismissed by the trial court for want of notice under section 377 of the Act.

5. The First Appellate court being the court of law and fact both, need not discuss in detail the issues formulated by the trial court in which it finds itself in agreement with the findings of the trial court. Nevertheless, it is desirable that the first appellate court on such issue/issues, records its own reason, in brief, even if no cross appeal has been preferred indicating as to how it agreed with the findings of the trial court. However, in para-12 of the judgment, the learned lower appellate court has clearly stated that the only point that was argued by both the sides was whether the suit was rightly dismissed for want of notice under section 377 of the Act. This shows that the respondent before the First Appellate court did not press its arguments against the findings of the trial court on the issues which went in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. If particular findings of the lower court relating to certain issues are not challenged in course of arguments before the first appellate court, that would only mean that the affected party has forsaken its objections against those findings. In that case, the first appellate court need not scrutinise the findings of the trial court by giving its own reason, even in brief, on su