S. S. Sandhwalia. C. J.

Whether a criminal charge of substantive murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code involves moral turpitude or not is the somewhat enigmatic question before this Full Bench, Pointedly at issue is the correctness of the Division Bench Judgment in Adya Singh-vs-The State of Bihar and other holding somewhat vacillatingly that it does not.

2. The petitioner hails from Village Barhi Dih, and was employed as an Assistant Teacher in the Government Primary School, Hewal, under the Keredari Block. On the 29th September, 1984, a first information report under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and allied offences was recorded at the Barhi Police Station, pertaining to the murder of one Sarju Sao of Village Barhi Dih. The petitioner was arrested on that charge on the 12th of November, 1984, and it was not till 3 months later, i.e., On the 12th of February, 1985, that he was enlarged on bail. On the 23rd of May, 1985, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet on two counts namely, the murder of Serju Sao of his native village and for remaining absent from the School without any prior information (vide Annexure 1'), to which he replied, Respondent No. 1, in the mean time, appointed Shree Jagannath Tripathy, Sub-Inspector of Schools, Koderma (Respondent No. 2), as the Inquiry officer for the departmental proceedings, and placed him under suspension, vide order dated the 21st March, 1986 (Annexure 3'). The petitioner makes some grievance of the delay in the finalization of the administrative proceedings, but the basic thrust of the petitioner is directed to the end that the charge of murder does not involve moral turpitude, and, therefore, is beyond the pale of Rule 100 of the Bihar Service Code.

3. At the threshold stage of admission itself, reliance on behalf of the petitioner was placed on Adya Singh-Vs-The State of Bihar and others (supra) which in turn was seriously assailed on behalf of the respondent State. The petition was consequently admitted to bearing by a Full Bench.

4. The controversy herein stems primarily from the language of Rule 100 of the Bihar Service Code, 1952, and, it is, therefore, apt to notice it at the very outset.

RULE 100: “A Government servant against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for attest for debt is pending should also be placed under suspension by the issue of specific order to this effect during periods when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisonment (e.g., while released on bail), if the charge made or proceeding taken against him is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude, In regard to his pay and allowances, the provisions of Rule 99 shall apply.”

Pinning himself with some literality on the language of the aforesaid rule, learned Counsel for the petitioner had contended that Rule 100 mandates suspension only in cases where the criminal charge involves moral turpitude. The firm stand sought to be taken was that though the charge and the offence of murder may be heinous, nevertheless, it is not the one which involves morel turpitude. Submissions were sought to be made on the ground that in exceptional situations a kilting of another human being may be justifiable or at least permissible in law.

5. In appraising the aforesaid submission and in construing Rule 100 one may first keep in mind that the said rule is not to be construed in total isolation. Indeed, it has to be read along with its preceding sister Rule 99. That rule provides for an automatic deemed suspension in cases where a Government servant his been arrested on a criminal charge or is detained under any law providing for preventive detention or for debt, during the period for which he remains in custody. The complementary Role 100 provides for the contingency when a Government servant is not actually detained or imprisoned as for example, when released on bail. A plain anal