Binod Kumar Roy, J :

The petitioner, the sole defendant, assails an order rejecting his written statement,

2. The relevant facts are in a narrow compass. The opposite party filed the suit in question on 17th July, 1987 for eviction of the petitioner under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act. 1982 (herein after referred to as the ‘Act’). She alleged that she is one of partner of M/s Simla Tailoring House and Simla Enterprises and wants to start the said business in the suit premise she requires the same bonafide for her personal use and occupation for manufacture of garments, mosquito net. and furnitures - wooden and steel. She will keep there machinary and accommodate workers. Thus the tenant-defendant is liable for eviction under Section 11 of the Act. the plaint was Submitted and a summon issued and served on the petitioner. The Petitioner appeared on July, 1987 filed & petition for grant of time to file his written Statement which was allowed till 22.8.1987. On 22.8.1987 also he again prayed for time to file his written statement which was allowed by the court till 8.9.1987. On 8.9.1987 a further petition for time was filed on which the trial court directed that the petitioner to file written statement till 24.9.1987. On 24.9.1987 even though an attendence was filed on his behalf, as well as a further petition for time when the suit was called out, the petitioner failed to appear, However, the petitioner was directed to file his written statement latest by 9.11.1987. On 9.11.1987 a petition (as contained in Annexure-A to the counter affidavit) was filed on behalf of the opposite party praying to commence the hearing of the suit by debarring the petitioner from filing written statement. However, on that day the petitioner filed his written statement. To the petition of the opposite party a rejoinder was also filed by the petitioner. The petition was heard and by the impugned order allowed holding that no leave having been prayed for, written statement in question cannot be accepted.

3. The revision petitioner assert, that while passing the said order the trial court has mis-interpreted the Plaint and over-looked the glaring fact that besides the ground of personal necessity other grounds were also taken therein and there fore the suit was not under section 14 of the Act. Further, While granting adjournments the court itself has not considered the suit in question to be on the ground of personal necessity alone otherwise it would not have granted time for filing written statement.

4. In the counter affidavit to the Revision petition it has been stated, inter alia, to the effect that no leave was prayed for by filing an affidavit despite grant of repeated opportunities on 31.7.1987, 22.8.1987, 8.9.1987 and 24.9.1981. Even though the petitioner filed his written statement on 9.11.1987 he again did not file any affidavit and pray for grant of leave. Even though the petitioner filed a rejoinder (as contained in Annexure-B to the councer affidavit) to the petition. Annexure-A, on 15.12.1987 he still failed to pray for grant of leave by filing an affidavit. The suit was on the grounds of personal necessity alone and not on any other ground viz. default in payment of rent and on account of damages caused to the suit premises.

5. Mr. Keshav Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that leave to contest can be sought for at any stage of the suit as held by this court in Basudeo Prasad Ps. Raghunath Prasad 1990 P.L.J.R. 356 and thus the court below has committed a jurisdictional error in allowing the petition of the opposite party. He also relies upon Rajendra Mahto Vs. Hart Narayan Mahto 1989 P.L.J.R. 489. He also points out that a general summon was sent.

6. Mr. Narendra Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, contends that in Basudeo Prasad's case; supra the moot question involved was as to whether leave should be refuse, if a petitio