The Commissioner's suo motu jurisdiction under Section 46(4) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, can be invoked even if the irregularities and illegalities are brought to his notice by the assessee.

G.B. Patnaik, C.J. -In all these fourteen cases a common question of law arises with regard to the interpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 46 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and as such they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The question that arises for consideration is whether under sub-section (4) of Section 46 of the Act the Commissioner would be justified in not invoking his suo motu jurisdiction on being satisfied as to the illegality or impropriety of order passed by a Sub-ordinate Officer merely because his jurisdiction was invoked by an assessee. The aforesaid question arises under the following circumstances which is briefly narrated.

3. The assessees, in respect of their sale transaction for different assessment years, had submitted the returns which had been accepted and the assessees paid taxes in accordance with returns. There was some dispute as to the liability of the assessees to pay tax on the turnover of purchase and sales in respect of medicine. The Assessing Officer on an erroneous view of law enhanced the taxable turnover of the assessees and raised additional demand for different assessment years. The assessees then invoked the suo motu jurisdiction of the Commissioner under sub-section (4) of Section 46 of the Act on the ground that the authorities had inherent lack of jurisdiction to enhance the taxable turnover and that too without even affording an opportunity of hearing and without noticing the assessees. The Commissioner had entertained the revision applications and also had heard the matter on several dates but all of a sudden refused to entertain the matter by a memo dated 5.6.95 on the ground that the Commercial Taxes Tribunal having held that after amendment of Section 46 (4) with effect from 3.5.89 the assessee has no right to apply for revision, the Commissioner cannot exercise power of revision on an application filed by the assessee. This order of the Commissioner is being assail eel in all these applications. The main basis of the petitioners' case is that the suo motu power conferred upon the Commissioner under sub-section (4) of Section 46 of the Act can be exercised by the Commissioner for examining the legality or propriety of an order passed in any proceeding by a subordinate authority. Even though an assessee may not have a right of a revision but when he brings forthwith materials before the Commissioner, the Commissioner's power to exercise his suo motu jurisdiction is not in any way fettered merely because the assessee has brought forth the materials before the Commissioner. The Commissioner having entertained the applications and having heard the matter on several dates erroneously refused to proceed further on a finding that he has no jurisdiction to exercise suo motu power since it is the assessee who has brought the matter before him and according to the learned counsel for the petitioner this tan-tamounts to refusal to exercise suo motu power available in law by a statutory authority.

4. Learned Advocate General appearing for the State on the other hand contended tt1at the legislative history, if looked into the conclusion would be irresistible that the legislature excluded a right of revision to an assessee and, therefore, the Commissioner rightly refused to entertain the matter and according to him this case is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v. M/s T.G. Lakshmaiah Setty & Sons: A.I.R. 1994 SC 2377. According to learned Advocate General in the aforesaid Supreme Court case their Lordships were examining a pari materia provision of A.P. General Sales Tax Act and having interpreted the same, the said interpretation would also squarely apply while interpreting Section 46 (4) of the Bihar Finance Act.

5. In view of the rival contentions of the parties the question that arises for our consideration is whether under sub-section (4) of Section 46 of