1993 Supreme(Pat) 447
HIGH COURT OF PATNA (RANCHI BENCH)
S. B. Sinha and Narayan Roy, JJ.
Sheela Sinha – Petitioner
versus
The State of Bihar and others - Respondents
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case no. 3330 of 1992 (R)
For the Petitioner - Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha.
For the Respondent - Mr. D. N. Sinha.
A statutory authority is not entitled to the exemption from court fee payment under the notification dated 21.9.70, which applies only to public demands payable to the Government.
Headnote:
BIHAR AND ORISSA PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT, 1914 - SECTION 5(2) - COURT FEE - EXEMPTION - STATUTORY AUTHORITY - INTERPRETATION - CERTIFICATE PROCEEDING - VALIDITY - COURT FEE PAYMENT REQUIREMENT.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenged the order directing the sealing of her shop in a certificate proceeding under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (the Act) for alleged arrears of rent. The petitioner contended that no court fee was paid by the certificate holder, respondent no. 3, and that the certificate proceeding was initiated for arrears of rent during her husband's possession.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that respondent no. 3, being a statutory authority, was not a Government and was not entitled to the exemption from court fee payment under the notification dated 21.9.70. The court found that the certificate proceeding was vitiated by the non-payment of court fee and was, therefore, a nullity in the eye of law.
Issues: 1. Whether respondent no. 3 was bound to pay court fee on the amount of claim sought to be recovered by way of public demand in the certificate proceeding. 2. Whether the certificate proceeding was valid despite the non-payment of court fee.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 5(2) of the Act requires every requisition made under the Act to be chargeable with a fee or amount equivalent to the court fee payable under the Court Fees Act, 1870, except in cases prescribed by the rules. 2. The exemption notification dated 21.9.70 applies only to public demands payable to the Government. Respondent no. 3, being a statutory authority, is not a Government and is not entitled to the exemption. 3. The certificate proceeding was vitiated by the non-payment of court fee and was, therefore, a nullity in the eye of law.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition, quashed the impugned order, and directed the respondents to put back the petitioner in possession of the shop. However, the court clarified that respondent no. 3 could initiate a fresh certificate proceeding in accordance with the law upon payment of due court fees.
S. B. Sinha, J. - The petitioner in this writ application has questioned the order dated 26-10-92 passed by respondent no. 2 as contained in Annexure 7 to the writ application whereby and whereunder the petitioner's shop has been directed to be sealed in a proceeding under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the said Act' for the sake of brevity) being certificate case no: 2/92-93. The aforementioned certificate proceeding was initiated at the in-' stance of the Managing Director of Industrial Area Development Authority for the alleged realisation of a $um of Rs. 52,313 by way of arrears of rent for the period from 3.4.76 to 23.4.84 in respect of a shop which was allotted in favour of the petitioner's husband. Admittedly, the shop bearing shop no. 15 of Ranch; Industrial Area Development Authority was allotted to the petitioner's husband and the possession thereof was given to him in April, 1976 on a monthly rental of Rs. 200/- per month. The original allottee died on 16.11.77. The said shop was, however, later on allotted to the petitioner by a letter dated 24.5.84 with retrospective effect from 14.11.79. The petitioner, by her letter dated 23.6.87 allegedly objected to allotment of shop with retrospective effect. She allegedly also disputed the quantum of arrears of rent.
2. However, according to the petitioner, without determining the aforementioned dispute a certificate proceeding was initiated for realisation of the aforementioned amount. The petitioner, upon receipt of a notice in terms of section 9 of the Act, filed her show cause, inter alia, raising the following questions :
(a) that the certificate is ab initio, illegal, void and without jurisdiction.
(b) that the alleged demand is not a public demand within the meaning of the Act and the same is not recoverable by way of certificate proceeding.
(c) that the copy of the requisition has not been served to the certificate debtor and as such the entire certificate proceeding is vitiated.
(d) that the requisition has not been properly signed and the same has not been verified in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act and the rules so framed thereunder and, as such, also the entire certificate proceeding is vitiated.
(e) that the certificate holder has not paid the requisition fees on the certificate and, as such also the initiation of the certificate proceeding and issue of notice under section 7 of the Act are illegal, void and without jurisdiction".
3. However, according to the petitioner, respondent no. 2 did not determine the said objection and by reason of the impugned order dated 26.10.92 took possession of the shop in question. It was also contended that no court fee had been paid by respondent no. 3 and thus the entire certificate proceeding is vitiated in law.
4. In this case a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no, 3 contending inter alia, that the impugned order is an appelable one. It has further been stated that respondent no. 3 is a State and thus no court fee was payable. According to the respondents, Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority had been created in terms of section 3 of the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Act 1974, Section 11 whereof postulates that rent due to the authority would be recoverable as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act.
5. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised only two contentions in support of this application. The learned counsel submitted that as no court fee was paid by respondent no. 3, the entire certificate proceeding was illegal. It was next contended that no certificate proceeding could have been initiated as against the petitioner for realisation of the arrears of rent for the period during which the petitioner's husband was in possession. Learned counsel, in support of his contentions, has relied upon a decision of