The Collector has jurisdiction to consider the cases of the parties before initiating a proceeding under section 48E of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, and is not required to refer the matter to the Board unless he is prima facie satisfied that the application filed by the Bataidar is bona fide.

Radha Malian Prasad, J.

In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 20.8.1991 passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Bhagalpur (Respondent No.2) in Batai Case No. 11/90-91, as contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition, whereby and whereunder the petition filed on behalf of the petitioner under section 48E of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has been rejected and, further, it has been held that the land-holders, namely, respondents no.3 and 4 are protected under the provisions of section 48C of the Act.

2. The facts of this case lie in a vry narrow compass. The petitioner, who claims to be under raiyat with respect to the land measuring an area of 3 acres 93 ½ decimals appertaining to Khata No.478, when threatened with unlawful ejectment from the samc, filed a petition under section 48E of the Act on 18.1.1991 before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, inter alia, claiming that he had been cultivating the lands in question on Bhouli basis for more

than 40 years and dividing the produce with the father of respondent no.3 and after his death with respondents no.3 and 4. On refusal by the petitioner to pay Salami demanded by respondent no. 3 he was threatened with the ejectment initially by respondent no. 3 and later by rcsponckntno.4 through her husband. Thereafter on 5.2.1991 the petitioner filed another application before the D. C. L. R. for restraining the aforementioned respondents from changing the physical feature of the aforementioned land as, allegedly, they were trying to dispossess him forcibly.

3. On 14.2.1991 the D.C.L.R. admitted the case and directed for issuance of notice to the aforementioned respondents. On another petition filed on behalf of the petitioner, the D.C.L.R. passed an order dated 2.4.1991 for maintenance of status quo with respect to the disputed land. Thus, according to the petitioner, the proceeding under section 48E(1) of the Act stands initiated and the only course left with the D.C.L.R. was to appoint the Board as required under section 48E(3) of the Act but instead of doing so he erroneously allowed the respondents to contest the claim and thereby assumed the jurisdiction of the Board as conferred under section 48E( 4) of the Act.

4. Respondents no.3 and 4 appeared before the. D.C.L.R. and filed their objections wherein they challenged the maintainability of the case besides denying the pleadings of the petitioner claiming cultivation by him over the land in question and also claimed protection under section 48C of the Act. It appears that respondent no.3 also inter alia, contend that he possessed less than 5 acres of irrigated land and that when he wanted to sell the land in question to respondent no.4, the petitioner instituted the present Batai case as he failed in his desire to purchase the same. The petitioner also filed rejoinder to the said objections. A report was called for by the D.C.L.R. from the Anchal Adhikari, Sultanganj regarding the claim of protection of section 48C of the Act of respondents no.3 and 4 and the same was submitted by the Anchal Adhikari on 4.6.1991. It appears that later another report was submitted by the Anchal Adhikari on 20.7.1991, whereafter the D.C.L.R. heard the counsel for the parties and after allowing to lead the evidence in support of their claim passed the impugned order.

5. Mr. Ganpati Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised short question that the D.C.L.R., having initiated a proceeding under section 48E of the Act, had no jurisdiction to hold an enquiry as to whether the petitioner was Bataidar or not. Learned counsel submitted that the the D.C.L.R. after proceeding was initiated as aforementioned had no option but to refer the matter to the Board in view of the provisions contained in section 48E(3) of the Act. It was also submitted by the learned counsel that section 48C of the Act has nothing to do with the initiation of a proceeding under sectio