Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 should be interpreted to mean that no appeal or second appeal shall lie in connection with any order for the recovery of possession of any premises in accordance with the procedure specified in this section.

S.K. Jha. – A reference of this Civil Revision application to the Division Bench with regard to the true interpretation of section 14 (8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1982 (Bihar Act No. 4 of 1983) (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity and convenience) has been necessitated by and is reminiscent of an old saying id perferctum est quod ex omnibus suis partious constat; et nihi perfectum est dum aliquied restal agendum; that is perfect which is complete in all its parts, and nothing is perfect whilst anything remains to be done. In this case the difficulty has arisen not from anything inherent in the subject itself which might be quite simple treated but by the loose draftsmanship which of late, has become more frequent in view of the vase increase in the number of new legislative enactments from time to time. When this case came up before a learned single judge of this Court at the admission stage itself a preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the opposite party that no civil revision application could be entertained under section 14(8) of the Act. This is once impels me to quote in extensor section 14 (8) of the Act running thus :

“14(8). No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section.

Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the ORDER :of eviction the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an ORDER :under the section, is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such ORDER :in respect there to as it thinks fit.”

On a plain primafacic reading of this section it would appear that a petition in revision may be filed before the High Court against an ORDER :for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure provided in the section. But ultimately the point which falls for decision will depend upon whether the well-settled canon of construction of statutes, namely, ut res magis valeat quam pereat is attracted or not. This section, namely, section 14 of the Act lays down a special summary procedure for disposal of cased for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement and in sub-section (1) thereof it has been specifically stated that every suit by a landlord, for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clauses (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. Clauses (c) of section 11 (1) of the Act lays down one of the grounds for eviction of a tenant by the landlord” where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord; provided that where the court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately air rent for the portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under section 5…..” We are not concerned with the remaining portion of this clause. Clause (e) of section 11 (1) of the Act applies to the case for eviction of a tenant holding a building on a lease for a specified period on the expiry of the period of tenancy. In nut shell section 11 (1)(c) applies to the case of personal necessity of the landlord and section 11 (1)(e) applies to the case of eviction on the expiration of the period prescribed under a contract of lease which means by efflux of time. The special summary procedure for disposal of case for evictio