The possession of a lessee from year to year or for a term of years in a proprietor's private land does not stand in the way of the proprietor being deemed to be a tenant under the State and of retaining possession over such land after the vesting of his estate.

Mahapatra, J.

Defendants are the appellants and the appeal arises out of a suit instituted for recovery of Rs. 1330/- as the price of half share in the mango crop grown on the land which had been given to the defendants by a registered instrument on the 5th of October, 1924 by the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest. The land on which the mango crop was grown was a zirat land of the granter. Plaintiffs complained that though they were entitled to half share of the mango crop from the defendants, they did not deliver that to the plaintiffs after 1958. The suit was for recovery of the price of the plaintiffs' share in the mango crop for two years before the suit was instituted on the 23rd of July, 1960. In the plaint plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were licensees under the document dated the 5th of October, 1924.

2. The suit was resisted on several grounds, one of them being that after the vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the plaintiffs had lost any right in the land on which the mango crop was grown and, therefore, was not entitled to any share in the mango crop with the defendants. They also pleaded that the land involved was bakasht land of the intermediary and not zirat.

3. The suit was decreed by the trial court which found with reference to Exts. A and B that the land was zirat and not bakasht, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to half share in the mango crop from the defendants. It also held on a reference to Exts 5, 5/A and 4 that the plaintiffs' interest in the land had not vested in the State of Bihar and they were entitled to possession thereof on payment of rent to the State.

4. On appeal by the defendants, the decree of the trial court was also confirmed in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence this Second Appeal.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that since the plaintiffs stated in Paragraph 6 of the plaint and also during the trial made the case that the defendants were in possession as licensees under them, the intermediary's interest having vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the intermediary (predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs) could not have the benefits provided under Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and as such, would not be entitled to recover any money in lieu of the mango crop from the defendants. Learned counsel further contended that the appellate court has not come to any clear finding as to whether the interest created in favour of the defendants by the ex-intermediary was a licence or lease. On reading the appellate judgment, I find that it held the interest created under the document dated the 5th of October, 1924 in favour of the defendants to be that of a lessee from year to year. The reasons in support of that view have been stated in the appellate judgment. No doubt, it considered the argument advanced on behalf of the defendants appellants before it in regard to the adverse character of possession of the defendants over the land after the death of the granter (licencer or lessor), on the ground that the licence was revocable. To repel that, the appellate court reasoned that if it was a licence, it was not so pure and simple, but was a licence coupled with profit and, therefore, was not liable to be revoked and was not to be deemed to have been revoked on the death of the licenser. This reasoning does not mean that the appellate court took the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants to be of licencers and licensees. Elaborate reasons have been stated in support of its conclusion that it was a lease from year to year. If that is right, then certainly the conclusion that the plaintiffs would be entitled to the benefits under Section 6(1)(a)(i) cannot be disputed.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants challenged the position that it was a case of lease from year to year. He referred to Paragraph 6 of the plaint to show that the case of the plaintiffs was one of licence and not of l