The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for timely substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of a deceased party in a writ proceeding, as per the principles outlined in previous judgments and the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963.

In the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of a consolidation proceeding under the provisions of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of fragmentation Act, 1956, sole petitioner Sheo Murat Dubey died on 9.9.2008, during the pendency of the main writ petition, leaving behind him his heirs and legal representatives. In the writ petition the sole petitioner has challenged the validity and correctness of the order dated 12.9.1995 passed in Revision Case No. 2714 of 1987 by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (HQ), Bihar Patna, as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition, allowing the claims of the private respondents with respect to the lands under dispute. The writ petition has been filed after an undue and unexplained long delay of 11 years.

2. Now, Interlocutory Application No. 2395 of 2013 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner (a dead person) before this Court on 22.3.2013 stating therein that during the pendency of main writ petition sole petitioner died on 9.9.2008 leaving behind him his heirs and legal representatives, who have been detailed in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid Interlocutory Application. Admittedly, the present Interlocutory Application has been filed seeking substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased petitioner after a long delay of 4 years 6 months and 12 days.

3. An objection has been taken by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State of Bihar and its functionaries that in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Case of Puran Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(1996) 2 SCC 205], the prayer for substitution made on behalf of the petitioner or his proposed heirs and legal representatives cannot be allowed at this stage, as the substitution petition has not been filed within a reasonable period of time, as a result of which the writ petition itself has abated, and the private respondents cannot be compelled to contest the claim, which due to abatement of the writ petition has become final in their favour.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State of Bihar and its functionaries, both have placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Puran Singh Vs. State of Punjab (Supra) (especially paragraph 12 of the judgment).

5. In order to appreciate the issues raised on behalf of the parties, it would be appropriate to reproduce paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judgment in Puran singh Vs. State of Punjab (Supra), which reads as follows:-

“As such even if it is held that Order 22 of the Code is not applicable to writ proceedings or writ appeals, it does not mean that the petitioner or the appellant in such writ petition or appeal can ignore the death of the respondent if the right to pursue remedy even after death of the respondent survives. After the death of the respondent it is incumbent on the part of the petitioner or the appellant to substitute the heirs of such respondent within a reasonable time. For purpose of holding as to what shall be a reasonable time, the High Court may take note of the period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act for substituting the heirs of the deceased defendant or the respondent. However, there is no question of automatic abatement of the writ proceedings. Even if an application is filed beyond 90 days of the death of such respondent, the Court can take into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case for purpose of condoning the delay in filing the application for substitution of the legal representative. This power has to be exercised on well-known and settled principles in respect of exercise of discretionary power by the High Court. If the High Court is satisfied that delay, if any, in substituting the heirs of the deceased respondent was not intentional, and sufficient cause has been shown for not taking the steps earlier, the H