The main legal point established in the judgment is that an employee cannot be denied wages when the dismissal is found to be against the principles of natural justice and in defiance of all accepted norms, and the employee was willing to work and pursuing remedies while the authorities were delaying in deciding the matter.

By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged that part of the order of the DIG, BMP which was passed on or about 09.06.1997, as contained in Annexure 1, to the extent it denies the petitioner back wages consequent to his reinstatement from dismissal.

2. It appears that petitioner was selected for appointment as a Constable in BMP 14 and was sent for one year training. Apparently while he was in training, he was summarily dismissed by order dated 17.10.1989. Petitioner filed an appeal before the DIG who, by his order dated 07.02.1990, remanded the matter for reconsideration. The order was not reconsidered but reaffirmed. Against this, the petitioner appears to have preferred a Memorial before the Inspector General, BMP who sent it to DIG, BMP, Central Zone for hearing and deciding the matter. By order dated 09.06.1997, the DIG passed the order, part of which is impugned. DIG clearly noted in the order that in the first three months of probation, a probationer could be terminated without show cause. In the present case, action was taken much after a year. What was the charge is not clear. Admittedly, no departmental proceeding at all was initiated nor any show cause asked. The dismissal order was, thus, neither in conformity with the statute nor in conformity with principles of natural justice. DIG, accordingly, set aside the order of dismissal and directed the petitioner to join. While doing so, he observed that the petitioner, who had been dismissed on 17.10.1989, would not be entitled to any remuneration for the period thereafter till the period he joins. It may be noted that subsequently by subsequent order, it is said that this period would be treated as extraordinary leave without pay in order to maintain continuity of service. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenges this part of the order by which petitioner has been deprived of his remuneration for the period he remained dismissed. It is submitted on behalf of petitioner firstly that this long period of dismissal was not because of his fault. He had filed an appeal immediately upon dismissal. It took the authorities almost seven years to decide the matter finally. The petitioner cannot be deprived of his wages for such a long period. Secondly, it is submitted that where the order of dismissal was palpably found to be wrong and moreso when it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction on the principle of no work no pay, an employee cannot be denied his wages because though the employee was willing to perform his duties, the employer had shut him out. In the counter affidavit and the supplementary counter affidavit all that is said is that the authorities were right in considering this to be a case of no work no pay. Accordingly, the order depriving petitioner of his remuneration was correct.

3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, with their consent, the writ petition is being disposed of at this stage itself.

4. In my view, the contention of the petitioner must succeed. First, it must be noticed that the manner in which petitioner was dismissed was not only against the principles of natural justice but was in accordance with the procedure not known to law. Even the DIG could not make head or tail out of the charge. It is not in dispute that neither any proceeding was initiated nor any notice issued and straightway petitioner had been dismissed. Whatever the charge may be this summary dismissal is wholly impermissible under our Constitution. It is not a case in which Article 311 (2) of the Constitution has been invoked by the authorities to dispense with enquiry. Thus seen, the dismissal of petitioner was in defiance of all accepted norms. It is consequent to such action that the petitioner was kept out of employment. Thus, can it be said that petitioner was either unwilling or unable to perform his duties. To the contrary, petitioner had been pursuing his right to rejoin his duty all along. It is the authorities who were taking their t