The main legal point established in the judgment is that similarly situated individuals should receive equal treatment, as mandated by Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, and the denial of benefits based on timing or lack of court orders is discriminatory and against constitutional principles.

A third supplementary counter affidavit, pursuant to orders of this Court, has been filed today on behalf of the respondents. Pleadings being complete, with consent of parties, this writ petition has been heard for its final disposal at this stage itself.

2. The facts of the case are not in controversy any more. It is the question of right that has to be decided in the present case.

3. The two petitioners were originally recruited as daily wage employee in work charge establishment prior to 1988. In 1988 both of them were regularized and put in regular pay-scale in the said work charge establishment. In the year 2002, they were issued notices that their initial appointment and their regularization as made in 1988 were bad. They were thus directed be reverted to the status of daily wage earners. While the matter was being considered, there were several other people similarly situated being treated by the State. All such people including these two petitioners approached this Court challenging their reversion. In the year 2002 itself interim orders were passed by the Court in those writ petitions. In interim order, it was stated that no coercive action can be taken against the petitioners. Ultimately, the writ petitions were disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court with a direction to the State to constitute a committee and enquire into the matter and take a decision in respect of their regularization. A three man committee was formed and, thereafter, in the year 2006 petitioners and their like were regularized in permanent establishment on newly sanctioned posts from the work charge establishment. A dispute arose when salary payment commenced. Deductions were made on account of Contributory Provident Fund (hereinafter referred to as “CPF”) and not on account of General Provident Fund (hereinafter referred to as “GPF”). The difference is that when there is CPF deduction it presupposes no pension payment upon retirement but if it is GPF then pension payment entitlement is there. This difference was because the State treated petitioners and their like as fresh appointees with effect from 2006 and, therefore, as prevalent in the year 2006, GPF having been discontinued, CPF deductions were made. Again, petitioners and their like filed separate writ petitions. Those writ petitions were allowed. It was clearly hold by this Court that petitioners had been in regular appointment under the State right from 1988, their GPF accounts had been opened and GPF subscriptions were credited to the said account since 1988 itself, hence they could not be treated as fresh appointees with effect from 2006. This position was accepted and CPF deductions were discontinued. It is not in dispute that after 2006 petitioners are being paid full remuneration with GPF deductions and not CPF deductions.

4. Petitioners’ case is that as it was not a case of fresh employment and petitioners were relegated in 2002 from regular employment to daily wagers, though they performed the same work, they were entitled to full remuneration for the period 2002-06. It is stated that in several writ petitions identical claims have already been adjudicated and allowed by this Court and State is paying those persons accordingly. These facts have been clearly brought out in the third supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners. In response to this third supplementary affidavit, a third supplementary counter affidavit has been filed.

5. In this third supplementary counter affidavit State raises only two pleas to deny the prayer and/or reliefs sought for by the petitioners with regard to payment of full remuneration for the period 2002-06. Firstly, they say that the order issued by the State to make payment to one Awadhesh Kumar on 05.11.2012 was sanctioned and the letter itself clearly stated that it will not be treated as a precedent. Thus, petitioners cannot ask for the same treatment. In the third supplementary counter affidavit, in this connection, it is fu