The main legal point established in the judgment is the limitation on condoning delay in filing appeals, as prescribed under Rule 7 of the Employees’ Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 1997.

Heard Sri Rajeev Kumar Verma, learned senior counsel, who was assisted by Sri Prashant Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Maheshwar Prasad Srivastava, learned counsel, who has appeared on behalf of the sole respondent.

2. The petitioner, invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has prayed for quashing of an Order Dated 24th September, 2014 passed by Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “Appellate Tribunal”) in ATA No. 346 (3) of 2014. By the said order the learned Appellate Tribunal has set aside the Order Dated 22.5.2013 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bihar, Patna, in a proceeding under Section 7A of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 1952”).

3. Short fact of the case is that though the respondent / establishment was under the cover of the Act, 1952, a complaint was received on an allegation that the establishment had denied membership of Employees Provident Fund to about 260 workers. Accordingly after conducting some necessary formalities a proceeding under Section 7A of Act 1952 was initiated. Finally the Assessing Authority i.e. the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner on the basis of balance sheet and other materials, had concluded that huge amount was not deducted and deposited in the account of E.P.F. Accordingly, assessment order was passed directing the respondent / establishment to deposit the balance amount of Rs. 3,36,30,306/- within specified time. The Order of assessment order under Section 7A of the Act was passed on 22.5.2013. It is case of the respondent that since direction was given to pay the amount within short period in terms of the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the respondent requested the Recovery Officer to allow him to deposit the amount in installments, which was paid in installments. The first installment was paid on 28.6.2013 and the last installment was paid on 29.3.2014. Thereafter, the Appeal was preferred by the sole respondent before the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, which was registered as ATA No. 346 (3) of 2014. Along with the Memo Of Appeal, the respondent also filed a petition for condonation of delay. The learned Appellate Tribunal after hearing the parties condoned the delay and finally, after hearing the matter on merit, set aside the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bihar. The petitioner aggrieved with the order of the Appellate Tribunal has approached this court by filing the present writ petition questioning the legality of the impugned order.

4. Sri Rajeev Kumar Verma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, at the very outset has argued that the order impugned is liable to be set aside solely on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal was not at all authorized to condone delay, even on any ground beyond the extended period of 60 days as prescribed under Rule 7 of the Employees’ Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules 1997”). It has been argued that as per Rule 7 of Rules 1997 an Appeal can be preferred by an aggrieved person against an Order passed by the Central Government or any authority under the Act within 60 days from the date of issuance of such notification / order. He further submits that the Appellate Tribunal has also been authorized to condone delay for further 60 days and that has to be condoned on sufficient grounds being placed to show that the appellant was restrained / prevented from filing such Appeal within time. According to Sri Verma, once in the Rule there was provision for condoning delay up to 60 days, after expiry of 60 days the Appellate Tribunal was not at all authorized to entertain the Appeal and he was required to reject the Appeal outrightly on the ground of delay. To substantiate his submission he has placed reliance on