An amendment to a statute is not retrospective unless it is expressly stated to be so.

ORDER :- This is an application for Review of an order passed on 12th of June, 2000, in F.M.A. 484 of 2000 (F.M.A.T. 3124 of 1992) by the Division Bench presided over by Mr. Justice Y. R. Meena and Mr. Justice R. K. Mazumdar, as Their Lordships then were.

2. Mr. Prosad has taken three grounds, the first of which is that while the judgment was reserved, Mr. Prosad was asked to submit his written notes on submissions but before written notes on submissions could be submitted the judgment was delivered. Mr. Prosad, in his written notes of submission, had cited some decisions, which he could not cite at the time of hearing. Since the judgment was delivered before he could submit his written submission, those decisions were not considered, and further the Court had assured that there would be further hearing before the delivery of the judgment but that was not adhered to. The second question he raised is that the Court did not take into consideration the law as it stood on 12th of June, 2000 in respect of the interpretation of Section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as was amended with effect from 1st of October, 1975. The Court had relied on the decision passed by the Kerala High Court, which, according to him, was not applicable. It did not consider the decision of the Bombay High Court in Union of India v. Manik Dattatreya Lotlikar, 1988 (172) ITR 1 : 1988 Tax LR 440 holding the field. Therefore, the judgment is per incuriam, which is a mistake apparent on record. The third question that he has raised is that the Company went into liquidation even before the husband of the petitioner ceased to be the Director of the Company. Therefore, on facts, the Court had committed a mistake apparent from record.

3. We have gone through the decision sought to be reviewed, namely, the decision in F.M.A. No. 484 of 2000 (F.M.A.T. No. 3124 of 1992) disposed of on 12th June, 2000 since reported in (2000) 245 ITR 196, Smt. Bidya Devi v. CIT. It appears from the said decision (12th June, 2000) that the Court had taken note of an earlier order passed by this Court between the parties in respect of the selfsame question passed in C.O. No. 154 (W) of 1985 on 17th of February, 1986 by Mr. Justice Suhas Chandra Sen, as His Lordship then was. In the said order (dated 17th February, 1986) the Court had held that the amendment of Section 179 effective from 1st of October, 1975 was not retrospective. The assessment for the year 1974-75 would be governed by the Income-tax Act as it stood on 1st of April, 1975 (p. 100 of the PB). Therefore, the amended provision could not be invoked in the case of the petitioner. It was also held (p. 100 of the PB) that unless the company was shown to have been gone into liquidation at the time when the Director had ceased to be a Director, Section 179 had no manner of application. However, the case was remanded to the Income-tax Officer for proper decision. It is noted in the decision (dated 12th June, 2000) that the

Assessing Officer found that the Company had not gone into liquidation. No appeal was preferred against the order of the Assessing Officer. There was a suo motu revision by the Commissioner of Appeals under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, against which this writ petition has been filed. The Commissioner of Appeal has not recorded any finding that the Company had gone into liquidation. On the other hand, it had proceeded on the basis of the decision in Manik Dattatreya Lotlikar, 1988 (172) ITR 1 : 1988 Tax LR 440 (supra) and had held that it is immaterial whether the Company had gone into liquidation or not and had applied Section 179 as amended with effect from 1st of October, 1975. This has since been challenged in this writ proceeding out of which this appeal arises.

4. The Court in the decision dated 12th June, 2000 had taken note of all these situations. Even if we assume that the contention of Mr. Prosad was not considered while delivering the judgment and that the situation in law was wrongly a