JUDGMENT :- We have heard the counsel for the appellant. The order passed by the Trial Court would show that the petition for setting aside the Award was not filed by the State within a period of 90 days as stipulated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In fact, the petition was received in the Central Filing Section on 19th of June, 2007 when the period of 90 days expired on 14th of June, 2007. The petition was, however, filed within a period of one month after the expiry of 3 months time from the date of the Award dated 18-2-2007 corrected on 13-3-2007. Taking note of the aforesaid fact, the Trial Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file an application seeking condonation of delay for the period between the time when 90 days expired and the date when the application was filed in Court. It was also directed that liberty so granted would remain in effect if the petitioner chose to act in terms thereof within a period of two weeks from the date of the Order, that is, 31st of July, 2007. Even this direction was not complied with by the Appellant-State. Ultimately, on the next date, the learned single Judge has observed that the liberty granted by the Order dated 31st July, 2007 being spurned, A. P. 201 of 2007 stood dismissed.

2. Having dismissed the petition, the Trial Court has, however, observed that the order will not stand in the way of the petitioner’s applying for condonation of delay and challenging the Award if the appellant-petitioner is otherwise entitled to in law.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argues that the arbitration petition has been filed by the appellant within the extended period of one month after the expiry of the initial period of three months. This course is permissible in view of the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, the learned Trial Court ought not to have dismissed the arbitration petition and insisted upon filing an application for condonation of delay. Learned counsel further submitted that in case the arbitration petition is now dismissed only on the ground that it is beyond limitation it would be causing injustice to the State as a huge amount of Rs. 3 crores is involved.

4. On the other hand, Mr. Jayanta Mitra, learned Senior counsel for the respondent submits that strictly speaking no application is permissible for condonation of delay under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act. According to the learned counsel, the wordings of sub-section (3) of Section 34 is such that applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is clearly excluded. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 : AIR 2001 SC 4010.

5. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have narrated the relevant facts which would clearly indicate the arrogant attitude which has been displayed by the State. Even though, strictly speaking, the appellant could not have been granted any further time for filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court still granted an opportunity to file such an application. Even this direction was not complied with by the State-appellant leaving the Trial Court with little alternative but to dismiss the arbitration petition. We are mindful of the legal position with regard to the law of limitation and the principles that govern the grant of leave to move an application beyond limitation. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court has laid down clearly the principles to be followed in considering the application for condonation of delay. Undoubtedly, in the aforesaid case it has been held that application for condonation of delay of the State are to be treated on the same footing as applications filed by the other litigants. It has also be

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