The court has the power to fix a time limit for the payment of the purchase money in a decree for specific performance, even though there is no express provision for it in the Specific Relief Act, 1877.

( 1 ) THE only question involved in the present appeal is whether the order rescinding the decree for specific performance of contract for sale of certain immovable properties originally passed in favour of the present appellant should be maintained.

( 2 ) THE present appellant filed a suit for specific performance of contract for sale to him of immovable properties comprising of land structures at and for the price of Rs. 6,000/ -. The suit was contested by the respondent and ultimately a decree for specific performance of the contract was passed in favour of the present appellant on condition that on plaintiff's depositing the balance of purchase money of Rs. 6,000/-, it is admitted that a sum of Rs. 1,000/- was paid in advance, within two months from the date of the decree the appellant would be entitled to get sale deed executed and registered in his favour in respect of the disputed property by the respondent and in default thereof, such sale deed would be executed and registered through court. What happened thereafter was that the appellant failed to deposit the balance of the purchase money within the time allowed by the court in the decree and consequently the respondent made an application stating, inter alia, that as he failed to deposit the balance of purchase money within the time allowed, the decree for specific performance became infructuous and prayed also for appropriate orders. This application was contested on several grounds but, ultimately, the Trial Court passed an order rescinding the decree for specific performance on the view that the appellant failed to deposit the balance of purchase money within the time allowed. On appeal the learned Appellate Court below substantially took the same view and dismissed the appeal.

( 3 ) BEFORE us in the first place, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that as there was no provision for fixing a time limit under Section 35 (c) of The Specific Relief Act, 1877, the parties being governed by this Act as the suit was instituted on 20-4-1963, failure to deposit that amount within the limited time allowed by the court in the decree could not have entitled the respondent to get an order of rescission of contract and consequently of the decree for specific performance. In support of such contention reliance was placed on a decision of the Judicial Committee in (1933) 37 Cal WN 379, Hansraj Gupta v. The Official Liquidators of the Dehradun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. , as also on another decision of Allahabad High Court in , Someswar Dayal v. Widow of Lal-man Shah and on a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 1926, Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra. For the purpose of this case, we do not think that the first two decisions have got to be gone into in details for the decision of the Judicial Committee has no application to the present case' and the Allahabad decision did not lay down any principle that the Court had no power to fix time limit in passing a decree for specific performance for payment of purchase money or balance thereof in Court. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court, in the first place, this was a matter of specific performance or rescission of contract or of decree for specific performance with regard to sale and purchase of certain movable properties namely company's shares and in the Second place in dealing with this aspect of the matter it was held that in the absence of any time limit, the performance of the decree by payment of purchase money should be made within a reasonable time. Clearly, therefore even applying the principle indicated in the decision of the Supreme Court we cannot uphold the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. Here the Court did fix a time limit, to pay the balance of purchase money and therefore the question of performance of that decree by payment of purchase money again within a reasonable time could not arise.

( 4 ) NOW, the further question is whether un