A provision in a statute that refers to a "condition" is a physical or factual assumption and not a legal assumption.

( 1 ) THE facts of this case have been set out in our Judgment delivered on April 21, 1969. In view of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners so far as Clause (b) of Section 8 (1) of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") is concerned we directed the Special Land Acquisition Judge at Alipore to report to us whether the lands in question Were in the same state on the date of publication of notification as they were on December 31, 1946. The report of the First Special Additional Land Acquisition Judge is now available. He has stated that the lands were not on the date of the publication of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act (that is on the 19th July. 1962), in the same state as they were on the 31st December, 1946 and that substantial improvement or development was made after that date.

( 2 ) THIS report of the First Additional Special Land Acquisition Judge makes the questions that were raised before us on Section 8 (1) (b) purely academic. If the lands on the date of the publication of notification were not in the same state as they were on the 31st December 1946 "the condition" prescribed in the latter part of Clause (b) of Section 8 (1) of the Act is not attracted to these lands at all. We are not therefore, giving our answers to questions 1 and 2 Which Mr. Amarendra Nath Gupta raised on behalf of the petitioners when the matter was first heard before us. Mr. Sengupta appearing for the State has submitted that the provision in the latter part of Clause (b) of Section 8 (1) should be read as a legal assumption and not a physical or factual assumption. We are unable to accept this contention on the language used in the latter part of Clause (b) of Section 8 (1 ). This provision speaks of a "condition" and not of any "assumption" either of fact or of law. We, therefore, overrule this contention of Mr. Sengupta.

( 3 ) WE have, however, to answer question No. 3 of Mr. Gupta mentioned in our judgment of the 21st April, 1969. The question is: 'whether the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act relating to Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894, has reduced and curtailed the quantum of compensation payable under the present Act and is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and if so, whether it is saved by Article 31-B of the Constitution and the Ninth Schedule thereto'? This question has to be answered in favour of Mr. Gupta in view of the three Supreme Court decisions which he placed before us. The Supreme Court seems to be of the opinion that the object of these legislations is 'acquisition' of lands and the purposes for which the acquisition is made are immaterial. In other words the Supreme Court has chosen to give a restricted meaning to the "objects sought to be achieved" by a particular legislation. Personally we may be of the view that "objects" of a statute should be more liberally construed but these Supreme Court decisions are binding on us and an elaborate discussion of our views on the subject would be wholly immaterial. We, therefore, proceed to refer to the Supreme Court decisions re-levant for determining the effect of Sub-section (2) of Section 8.

( 4 ) IN the Dy. Commr. and Collector, Kamrup v. Durganath Sarma, the Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion Act 1955 was considered. The Supreme Court has said that in the State of Assam some land may be taken under Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 for the purpose of works and other measures in connection with flood control and prevention of erosion on payment of nominal compensation while an adjoining land may be taken for other public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on payment of adequate compensation. This differential treatment of land acquired under the two Acts is not permissible under Article 14. The constitutional guarantee of Article 14 requires that all persons shall