SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1972 Supreme(Cal) 131

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Sankar Prasad Mitra, A. K. Janah
CHITTARANJAN MONDAL - Appellant
Versus
SANKAR PROSAD SAHANI - Respondent
Civil Rule 3439 (F)  Of  1971
Decided On : MAY 18, 1972

Advocates Appeared:
APURBADHAN MUKHERJI, KANAN KUMAR GHOSH, N.CHOWDHURY, SYAMA PRASANNA ROY CHOWDHURY

An order refusing to grant an injunction restraining execution of a judgment decree is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Headnote:

LETTERS PATENT APPEAL - JUDGMENT - MEANING - ORDER REFUSING INJUNCTION RESTRAINING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT DECREE - WHETHER APPEALABLE - TESTS - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (ACT V OF 1908), ORDER 43, RULE 1.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff instituted an Ejectment Suit in the City Civil Court. The tenant-defendant preferred an appeal to this Court. In this appeal the tenant-defendant made an application for an injunction restraining the plaintiff from executing the ejectment decree. This application for injunction came up for hearing before Amaresh Roy. J. and His Lordship dismissed the application on the 23rd November 1971. Against this order of dismissal the tenant-defendant has preferred a Letters Patent Appeal and this Rule has been obtained in connection with that appeal.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the order of Amaresh Roy, J. refusing to grant an injunction restraining execution of the judgment decree was passed in an independent proceeding which was ancillary to the appeal and as such it is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The court also held that this is an appealable order.

Issues: Whether the order of Amaresh Roy, J. refusing to grant an injunction restraining execution of the judgment decree is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the third test of White C. J. to the facts of this case. The order of Amaresh Roy, J. refusing to grant an injunction restraining execution of the judgment decree was passed in an independent proceeding which was ancillary to the appeal and as such it is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Final Decision: The court held that the order of Amaresh Roy, J. refusing to grant an injunction restraining execution of the judgment decree is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The court also held that this is an appealable order.

SANKAR PRASAD MITRA, J.

( 1 ) THIS Rule is against an order of Amaresh Roy, J. made on the 23rd November. 1971. The plaintiff instituted an Ejectment Suit in the City Civil Court. By its judgment delivered on July 12, 1971, the City Civil Court passed a decree for ejectment. The tenant-defendant preferred an appeal to this Court. It was Appeal No. 2365 of 1971. In this appeal the tenant-defendant made an application for an injunction restraining the plaintiff from executing the ejectment decree. This application for injunction came up for hearing before Amaresh Roy. J. and His Lordship dismissed the application on the 23rd November 1971. Against this order of dismissal the tenant-defendant has preferred a Letters Patent Appeal and this Rule has been obtained in connection with that appeal.

( 2 ) MR. Roy Choudhury appearing for the plaintiff in the Ejectment Suit has raised a preliminary objection. He says that the order of Amaresh Roy, J. dismissing the application for injunction is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The order according to Mr. Roy Choudhury does not affect the merits of the controversy between the parties nor does it determine any right or liability of any of the parties. In other words, the order does not decide either wholly or partly any of the matters in dispute in the suit itself, Mr. Roy Choudhury contends that the word 'judgment' in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent means a judgment or decree which decides the case one way or the other either in its entirety or in part It does not, says Mr. Roy-choudhury, mean a decision or order of an interlocutory character, which merely decides some isolated point not affecting the merits of the case. Learned Counsel has referred us to a large number of decisions in support of his contention as aforesaid. We do not intend to deal with all the cases cited. For our purpose in this matter it is necessary to mention the decision of Sir Richard Couch. C. J. , in the Justices of Peace v. The Oriental Gas Co. , (1872) 8 Bens LR 433. Couch. C. J. has stated :"we think 'judgment' in Clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be final, or preliminary or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it. leaving other matters to be determined".

( 3 ) THIS view of Couch, C. J. has been considered from time to time by numerous decisions by this Court as well as other High Courts and the definition of 'judgment' which the learned Chief Justice gave was variedly interpreted. In a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa, (1912) ILR 35 Mad 1 (FB), White. C. J. has considered the view of Couch. C. J. and has stated: "the test seems to me to be not what is the form of adjudication but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made. "

( 4 ) WHITE. C. J. has laid down three tests for determining whether an order is a 'judgment' within the meaning of the corresponding clause of the Madras Letters Patent These tests are as follows:-- (1) If its effect is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned; or (2) if the non-compliance therewith will have the effect to put an end to such suit or proceeding; or (3) if it is passed in an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit (not instituted as a step towards judgment, but with a view to rendering the judgment effective when obtained) e. g. , an order on an application for temporary injunction or for the appointment of a receiver.

( 5 ) MOOKERIEE, J. (sitting with Patterson J.) in Lea Badin v. Upendra Mohan Roy Chaudhury. 39 Cal WN 155 = (AIR 1935 Cal 35) had to deal with an order made by a single Judge on the Original Side of this Court discharging an inte





Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top