ANIL KUMAR SEN, J.

( 1 ) THIS Rule, issued on a writ petition, raises a simple question as to whether an earlier decision rendered by a competent authority in a proceeding under Section 5a of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) in respect of a particular transfer of a particular land constitutes a bar in law for a same proceeding by the same authority in respect of the same transfer and over the same land.

( 2 ) IT is not disputed that by a registered deed of Nirupan Patra (a deed of family settlement) dated October 9, 1953 but registered on February 1, 1954 certain lands were transferred by one Fakir in favour of his three sons the present petitioners. The Revenue Officer of Sarenga duly authorised under Section 5a of the said Act, started several proceedings in respect of several plots of land covered by the said deed under Section 5a of the said Act on the basis that the aforesaid transfer is liable to be declared not bona fide. Notice of the said proceedings having been served on Fakir and the present petitioners, they contested the said proceedings. All the proceedings were heard together as the only question involved was as to whether the transfer by Fakir in favour of his sons dated October 9, 1953 was bona fide or not. 2a. After a contested adjudication the Revenue Officer came to the conclusion that as the disputed transfer was a bona fide deed of family settlement; it did not come within the mischief of the provision of Section 5a of the said Act. To quote his finding in part:"examined the parties, the deed and the relevant records. It transpires that the transfer in question was made with the bona fide intention to settle disputes among the sons. The deed is a registered Arpannama with a bona fide intention and as such it is not a gift and does not constitute a transfer as contemplated under Section 5a of the Estates Acquisition Act. Hence ordered that the cases be struck out. "

( 3 ) THIS decision was rendered on March 13, 1959 and it is apparent that the Revenue Officer was basing his decision on the provision of Section 5a (7) (iii ). It would not be necessary for me to consider whether this particular decision of the Revenue Officer was correct or not in law but it appears to me that there was no appeal against the said decision under Section 5a (6) and the proceeding was finally disposed of on such decision.

( 4 ) IT is also not disputed now before me that long after eight years a Special Revenue Officer respondent No. 2 similarly authorised under Section 5a of the said Act has again started a fresh proceeding under Section 5a for adjudicating whether the aforesaid transfer dated October 9, 1953 by Fakir in favour of his sons, the present petitioners, in respect of the same lands is bona fide or not. The initial order by which the Revenue Officer assumed jurisdiction and initiated the proceedings is the subject-matter of challenge in this Writ petition.

( 5 ) THE only point raised in the Writ petition and canvassed before me by Mr. Roy appearing in support of this Rule is that the entire proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Wo. 2 as it was not open to him to start a fresh adjudication under Section 5a of the said Act which must be deemed to be barred by the earlier decision dated March 13. 1959. It appears that the respondent No. 2, the Special Revenue Officer was conscious of such a possible ob-3eetion and even in the ex parte order whereby he initiated the proceeding he considered such an issue. He, however, came to the conclusion that as in the earlier proceeding the Revenue Officer concerned had not completed the enquiry it cannot be said that he had passed any final order which alone could invoke the principle of res judicata. Accordingly, he came to the conclusion that he would have still the jurisdiction to readjudicate notwithstanding the earlier decision by his predecessor in office above referred to. It is the correctness and the

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