ANIL KUMAR SEN, J.

( 1 ) IN this Rule the petitioner is challenging an order dated August 2, 1968 passed in a proceeding initiated suo motu under Section 44 (2a) of the West Bengal Estates' Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act ).

( 2 ) THERE is no dispute that the disputed land appertaining the several khatians stands recorded in the name of the present petitioner in the finally published record-of-rights. A proceeding under Section 5-A of the said Act was unsuccessfully initiated in or about June, 1968, but as the transfers had taken place long prior to May 5, 1953, such proceeding was dropped. But immediately thereafter a suo motu proceeding under Section 44 (2a) was instituted by the Assistant Settlement Officer and a notice dated July 17, 1968 was issued on the petitioner. This notice however discloses no ground for exercise of powers under Section 44 (2a) but only reads as a notice fixing a date of hearing. It recites that whereas an application has been filed under Section 44 (2a) and whereas the said application has been fixed for hearing on July 22, 1968, therefore the petitioner is directed to appear to show cause if any. The petitioner appeared and he was called upon to support the entries in his favour. He produced certain documents of purchase of some of the disputed plots from different persons all effected in the year 1947 and 1952. The Assistant Settlement Officer however came to the conclusion that such purchases were made benami by the father of the petitioner in petitioner's name. On such finding he directed deletion of the name of the petitioner in respect of the disputed plots and instead thereof directed such land to be recorded in the name of petitioner's father. This was the order which was passed on August 2. 1968 and which is the subject-matter of challenge in this Rule.

( 3 ) MR. Gorai appearing in support of this Rule has raised two points in support of his contention that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction. In the first place. Mr. Gorai contends that if the proceeding was initiated on any application as indicated by the notice, then it is clearly barred by limitation as prescribed by the Act; if on the other hand, the proceeding was initiated suo motu the notice falls short in not disclosing any ground or reason why such a proceeding was initiated and it does not indicate why or in what manner the finally published record-of-rights need any revision. Secondly Mr. Gorai contended that the Assistant Settlement Officer had no jurisdiction in law to enter into the question of title in the manner done by him.

( 4 ) THE Rule is being contested by the respondents who have filed an affidavit-in-opposition and Mr. P. K. Sengupta is appearing to support the order.

( 5 ) IN my view both the contentions raised by Mr. Gorai are of great substance. It is not disputed that if initiated on an application the proceeding is barred by limitation prescribed by the Act. The respondents themselves in their affidavit therefore claim the proceeding to be one initiated suo motu. Unfortunately the notice discloses no ground why such a proceeding is being initiated. Nor does it indicate why or in what manner the finally published record needs revision. Except describing the notice as a notice of a proceeding under Section 44 (2a) there is nothing in the notice to indicate that it is a proceeding for revision of finally published record-of-rights. This Court has repeatedly held following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Swastik Oil Mills v. H. B. Munshi, that no proceeding under Section 44 (2a) can competently be initiated except by disclosing some grounds for exercise of such suo motu powers. It is but a part of the principles of natural justice that a man must be told as to why or in what manner or for what reason the records standing in his favour are to be revised. Or in other words, he must know the case which he is to meet in the proceeding. A proceeding which

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