A garnishee order under Section 226 (3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, can only be issued in respect of the income-tax liability of a taxpayer to persons from whom money is due or may become due to the assessee or who may subsequently hold money for or on account of the assessee.

( 1 ) THIS rule challenges the validity of certain notices issued by the-respondent-income-tax Officer on the Union Bank of India Ltd. , respondent No. 4, and Messrs. Andrew Yule and Company Ltd. , respondent No. 5, directing-them to pay to the respondent-Income-tax Officer any amount due from them or held by them for or on account of the petitioner to meet the tax liability of a firm called Messrs. Dunichand Sons and Company. The rule was issued on the 30th April, 1968, calling upon the respondents, the Income-tax Officer, "k" Ward, District 1 (1), Calcutta, the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal III, Calcutta, and the Union of India to show cause why the aforesaid notices should not be quashed, and the said respondents restrained from giving any effect to the impugned notices.

( 2 ) THE facts as alleged in the petition are shortly as follows: Under a deed of partnership dated the 24th July, 1960, and registered under the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, one Bimala Devi Rateria, the wife of Jaidayal Rateria, and one Krishnakanta Rateria, wife of Dewan Chand Rateria, agreed to carry on business with equal shares on and from the aforesaid date under the name and style of P. K. Trading Company. Subsequently, the partnership was reconstituted under a fresh deed of" partnership dated the 9th May, 1962, with effect from the 13th April, 1962, whereby the shares of these two ladies were reduced to 40 per cent. each and a new partner, Onkarmal Rateria, with a share of 20 per cent. was introduced. There has also been a subsequent reconstitution of this firm which is not material for the purpose of this application. The assessment of the petitioner firm for the assessment years 1962-63, the first year of the business of the firm, and 1963-64, were completed by the Income-tax Officer, District V (I), Calcutta, on the 7th February, 1967, and the 29th February, 1968. In the order for the first assessment the Income-tax Officer took the status of the petitioner to be an association of persons as against that of a unregistered firm claimed and further held that as the source of capital introduced in the business could not be explained and, as the two ladies who were claiming to be. partners of the firm did not, in fact, conduct the business of the firm, the firm was not genuine. The assessment order went on to state that as the source of capital could not be explained satisfactorily the assessment was being completed as a protective measure. As the husbands of the alleged partners were doing individual business and were being assessed separately, considering the circumstances of the case, it was assumed that this concern was a benamidar of their husbands. Hence, this concern was being assessed on protective measure and the total income was determined at Rs. 18,231. For the subsequent year also the Income-tax Officer, following his decision in the earlier year, held that the income of the petitioner firm was the benami income of the husbands of the two ladies, but, as the return was filed in the name of the concern, the assessment was made without prejudice to any order that might be passed by any authority of the income-tax department. In that year the total income of the firm consisting of the two ladies up to the period of the introduction of the third partner was determined at Rs. 3,557. Appeals were preferred against the two assessment orders by the petitioner and the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in respect of the appeal for the assessment year 1962-63, dated the 27th August, 1969, i. e. , long after the rule was issued, has been filed before me and in this order the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has refused to go into the question of benami or whether a protective assessment as purported to have been made in this case was permissible. On the merits, however, he held that it could not be said that the introduction of the capital of the business was unexplained and he deleted the additi