A bona fide mistake of law can be a sufficient ground for condoning a delay in filing an appeal.

( 1 ) THIS is an application for an order that the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned On 15 June 1966 a preliminary decree was passed declaring the shares of the parties and directing the premises to be sold by auction. Thereafter the petitioner who is defendant No. 1 in this suit received an offer from an outsider for purchase of the premises. The petitioner made an application for an order for varying or modifying the decree dated 15 June, 1966 which provided that the premises be sold by public auction The application was made on 18 August, 1966 By a Judgment dated 27 February, 1967 the application was disposed of and the decree dated 15 June, 1966 was not disturbed

( 2 ) THE petitioner on 3 April, 1967 filed an appeal against the judgment and order dated 27 February 1967.

( 3 ) ON 3 April, 1967 the petitioner gave requisition for certified copy of the decree dated 15 June, 1966 The draft decree was settled and passed on 11 April, 1967. Thereafter the petitioner made this application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the decree dated 15 June, 1966. This application is dated 28 April 1967.

( 4 ) AFTER the decree was passed on 15 June 1966 the plaintiff's solicitor on 17 June 1966 gave requisition for drawing up of the decree.

( 5 ) ON 22 August, 1966 an application was made for variation of the decree. On 6 December 1966 there was an order for stay of the settlement of the draft decree. The stay order was vacated on 27 February, 1967.

( 6 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner submits that there should be condonation of delay because, first, there was a requisition given for drawing up of the decree; and secondly, the decree was not in fact drawn up until 11 April, 1967 and the decree was signed on 25 May, 1967. It is therefore said that the petitioner could not obtain copy of the decree. It is also said that the petitioner in the present case followed the practice of this court and was advised by his solicitor to believe that there was no necessity to apply for a certified copy of the decree earlier as the decree had not been settled or passed and requisition for drawing up of the decree had already been given. It is, therefore, said on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner and the solicitor bona fide believed that under the existing practice time taken by the Court in drawing up and completing the decree should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal it is also said that the petitioner has been diligent in applying for a certified copy of the decree and the time for obtaining copy of such decree did not expire.

( 7 ) THE petitioner relies on an affidavit affirmed by Shri Pashupati Nath Ghosh He is the senior partner of M/s Kar Mehta and Co. In his affidavit he state? that following the practice of this Court as laid down in the derision in Parijat Devi's case, reported in AIR 1932 Cal 331 (FB) and the decision of the Supreme Court reported in and under the existing law, the solicitor bona fide believed and advised the appellant that there was no need to apply for a certified copy of the decree dated 15-6-1966 as the requisition for drawing up of the decree had already been given by the plaintiff's solicitor on 17th June, 1966 and the draft of the decree had not been settled or passed by the Registrar-in-Insolvency in view of the settlement thereof having beer, staved pursuant to an order made by Datta J in the suit.

( 8 ) IT will appear from the decision in Secretary of State v. Smt. Parijat Devi, in AIR 1932 Cal 331 (FB) that the word 'requisite' occurring in Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 would mean properly required and it would have to be shown that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period was due to default and but for the time which was taken up in drawing up a decree by the officials of the Court in preparing and issuing documents the party was not responsible for the delay. It was said in that case that in the case of an appeal fr