HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
P. C. Mallick
JYOTIRMOYEE SHARMA - Appellant
Versus
UNION OF INDIA - Respondent
Suit 2288 Of 1952
Decided On : AUGUST 2, 1961
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 - ARTICLE 311(2) - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 - SECTION 240(3) - FUNDAMENTAL RULES - RULE 55B - CIVIL SERVICE - TERMINATION OF SERVICE - WRONGFUL DISMISSAL - DAMAGES - LIMITATION ACT, 1908 - SECTION 80 - NOTICE - ESTOPPEL - RATIFICATION - PROBATIONARY PERIOD - CONFIRMATION - NATURAL JUSTICE - SHOW CAUSE NOTICE - ENQUIRY - PUNISHMENT - STIGMA - CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT - DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISMISSAL - MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, an M.A. and Ph.D. of the Chicago University in Sociology, was offered a permanent post of Anthropologist by the Government in the Department of Anthropology in the Indian Museum on June 7, 1949, which offer she accepted. Prior to this appointment, she was working in the same department as a temporary Anthropologist which office she relinquished before accepting the new appointment. In the new post, she was to be on probation for 2 years. The plaintiff's service was terminated by a letter dated June 2, 1952, addressed to her by the Director Of Anthropology Sri. B. S. Guha. Prior to this, she was charge-sheeted. She denied the charges and demanded a judicial enquiry.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the plaintiff was appointed in a permanent post on June 7, 1949, but she should be on probation for two years. Two years expired on June 7, 1951. On the expiry of the period, neither she was expressly confirmed in her service nor her service terminated. What then was her position in service after June 7, 1951? The court held that after the expiry of the probationary period, the plaintiff became a permanent incumbent in the office though for a period of two years she would be on probation. During the probationary period of two years, her probation and service is liable to be terminated. But if the Government chooses not to terminate the probation and service within the probationary period of two years the plaintiff acquires the full status of a permanent officer on the expiry of the two years. There was no power reserved to the Government to extend the probationary period. It cannot, therefore, be contended that in the absence of actual confirmation she automatically continues to be a probationer till the date of actual confirmation or till the date of termination of her service.
Issues: 1) Is there any valid and binding contract of service between the plaintiff and the, defendant in view of the provisions of Section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. 2) Did the plaintiff have the permanent post of Anthropology as mentioned in paragraph 3 of the plaint. 3) Did the plaintiff have any opportunity of defending herself? Was there any enquiry held therefor. 4) Was the principle of natural justice observed and followed as mentioned in paragraph 12 of the plaint. 5) Is the plaintiff entitled to the declaration asked for. 6) Is the plaintiff entitled to any damage as mentioned in paragraph 15 of the plaint. 7) Has the plaintiff any cause of action. 8) Is the plaintiff entitled to any relief.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plaintiff was appointed in a permanent post on June 7, 1949, but she should be on probation for two years. Two years expired on June 7, 1951. On the expiry of the period, neither she was expressly confirmed in her service nor her service terminated. What then was her position in service after June 7, 1951? The court held that after the expiry of the probationary period, the plaintiff became a permanent incumbent in the office though for a period of two years she would be on probation. During the probationary period of two years, her probation and service is liable to be terminated. But if the Government chooses not to terminate the probation and service within the probationary period of two years the plaintiff acquires the full status of a permanent officer on the expiry of the two years. There was no power reserved to the Government to extend the probationary period. It cannot, therefore, be contended that in the absence of actual confirmation she automatically continues to be a probationer till the date of actual confirmation or till the date of termination of her service.
Final Decision: The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that the order of dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendant is wrongful, illegal void, inoperative and of no consequence whatsoever. The court also held that the plaintiff still remains entitled to hold the office of Anthropologist in the Department of Anthropology as mentioned in the foregoing plaint from which the plaintiff was removed by an illegal order of the defendant. The court further held that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs. 30,000/- as damages for wrongful dismissal.
( 1 ) THIS is a suit by a Government employee for a declaration that the order terminating her service is wrongful, illegal and void and that she is still entitled to the office. There is an alternative case made for damages for wrongful dismissal.
( 2 ) THE plaintiff is an M. A. and Ph. D. of the Chicago University in Sociology. Her case is that she; was offered a permanent post of Anthropologist by the Government in the Department of Anthropology in the Indian Museum on June 7, 1949 which offer she accepted. Prior to this appointment she was working in the same department as a temporary Anthropologist which office she relinquished before accepting the new appointment. In the new post she was to be on probation for 2 years.
( 3 ) THE plaintiff's service was terminated by a letter dated June 2, 1952 addressed to her by the Director Of Anthropology Sri. B. S. Guha. Prior to this she was charge-sheeted. She denied the charges and demanded a judicial enquiry.
( 4 ) THE order terminating her service is challenged on the ground that it is in contravention of the Constitution and of the Fundamental Rules. The order it is alleged is void, inoperative and of no effect. The order is fur-ther characterised as malicious, arbitrary ana capricious, mala fide and illegal. In paragraph 15 of the plaint the case of wrongful dismissal is made and damages assessed at Rs. 5,34,804/-have been claimed.
( 5 ) THE reliefs claimed are as follows: (a) A declaration that the order of dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendant is wrongful, illegal void, inoperative and of no consequence whatsoever. (b) A declaration that the plaintiff still remains entitled to hold the office of Anthropologist in the Department of Anthropology as mentioned in the foregoing plaint from which the plaintiff was removed by an illegal order of the defendant. (c) Alternatively, a decree for Rs. 534804/-es mentioned and claimed in paragraph 15 of the foregoing plaint.
( 6 ) IN the written statement it is pleaded that the plaintiff was a probationer and during the probationary period her services were ter-minated. It is denied that she was dismissed. All allegations made as to contravention of the Constitution and/or of the Fundamental Rules are denied. It is denied that the order terminating her service was void and/or unlawful and/or inoperative, malicious or arbitrary. It is denied that the plaintiff has any right to continue in the post of Anthropologist or to hold the same or that her removal from this office is wrongful. The claim for damages has been disputed. It is contended that the letter of appointment dated June 7, 1949, does not comply with the requirements of Section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and that in consequence there was no vaild and binding contract of service between the plaintiff and the Government.
( 7 ) TO meet the above defence the plaint appears to have been amended pursuant to an order of the Court dated March 16, 1955. By this amendment, a new paragraph was added to the plaint being paragraph 3a, It is pleaded in that paragraph that the Union of India accepted and treated the plaintiff to be a government servant in lawful employment. A case of estoppel and ratification is made out in the said paragraph. Apparently, this new case was made to come within the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Chatturbhuj Vithaldas.
( 8 ) IN the additional written statement filed in answer to the new amendment, all allegations in the new paragraph of the plaint have been traversed. It is alleged that the contentions raised in the amended paragraph do not form a part of the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the premises, the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is in any event insufficient and invalid.
( 9 ) ON the pleadings the following Issues were raised:1) Is there any valid and binding contract of service between the plaintiff and the, defendant in view of the prov
REFERRED TO : Ranjan Kumar Chakravarty v. State of West Bengal
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Satish Chander v. Union of India
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P.N.Sarkar v. The State of Bihar
Naresh Chandra v. Director of Fisheries, Govt. of West Bengal
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