A tenant who continues in possession after the termination of their tenancy remains a statutory tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and is liable for rent.

RENUPADA MUKHERJEE, J.

( 1 ) THE defendant of the trial court, Murlidhar Garodia, is appellant in this appeal. Respondent Purushottam Lal Jain instituted a suit against the-appellant for evicting him from an almirah shop on the ground floor of premises No. 194/198 Cross Street, Calcutta. A notice to quit is said to have been served upon the appellant requiring him to vacate the disputed shop after the expiry of 1st February, 1958. The suit was instituted: under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 on the ground that the tenant was a statutory defaulter and had forfeited his claim to protection by reason of defaults committed by him in payment of rent.

( 2 ) VARIOUS defences were taken by the tenant in his written-statement. We need not refer to all of them in this appeal. The trial court overruled the objections taken by the tenant defendant in his writ ten-statement and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. So the tenant has preferred this appeal.

( 3 ) THE only point pressed on behalf of the appellant by Mr. Lala in this appeal is that the notice served upon the appellant was not a valid or sufficient notice. This contention arises in the following way.

( 4 ) A notice by registered post was served upon the appellant requiring him to vacate the disputed almirah shop on the expiry of the 1st day of February, 1958. It is not disputed that clear one-month's notice was given to the appellant as required by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The only contention put forth by Mr. Lala was that the tenancy ran from the first day of each English calendar month upto the last day of that month and so the notice by which the tenant was required to vacate the shop on the expiry of the 1st day of February, 1958, was not a legal or valid notice. In order to understand whether there is any substance in this contention of Mr. Lala we shall have to examine a registered lease which was admittedly executed by both the parties. This lease was marked Exhibit (1) in the trial court. The lease shows that the appellant was inducted in the disputed almirah shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 20/ -. The lease was to commence from the 1st of July, 1955, and the term of the lease was limited to a period of two years from that date. Clause (e) of the lease is material for our purpose. It provides that the tenant shall unconditionally vacate the demised premises and give over vacant and peaceful possession of the said premises to the lessor "just with the expiry of the said lease-period of two years certain".

( 5 ) MR. Lala contended that this period of two years should be taken to have expired with end of June, 1957, and the anniversary of the date of the commencement of the lease should not be taken into account in deciding the question of the date of the termination of the lease. In support of this contention Mr. Lala drew our attention to some other portions of the lease where it has been stipulated that the monthy rent of Rs. 20/- would be payable, month by month, on the 1st day of every succeeding English calender month. From this provision of the lease Mr. Lala contended that it was the intention of the parties that the lease would come to an end with the expiry of an English calendar month and the term of the lease would not enure to any period beyond the expiry of the last date of a particular month. After having carefully considered this argument of Mr. Lala and after having considered the various terms of the lease, we are unable to accept this construction of the lease regarding the date of its termination. In our opinion, a lease of the present description falls within the second paragraph of Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that 'where the time so limited is a year or a number of years, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the lease shall last during the whole anniversary of the day from which such time commences'. In this case, the time limited by the lease was a period of two years. Th

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