SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1960 Supreme(Cal) 127

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Sinha
NRISHINGHA MURARI CHAKRAVARTY - Appellant
Versus
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND COLLECTOR, HOOGHLY - Respondent
Civil Revn. Case 578  Of  1960
Decided On : JUNE 13, 1960

Advocates Appeared:
Arun Kumar Dutt, BIBHUTI BHUSAN MUKHERJEE, J.Majumdar, SOMENDRA C.BOSE

The government has the inherent right to suspend its servants pending criminal proceedings, and this power is not limited by any statutory rules or regulations.

Headnote:

SUSPENSION - GOVERNMENT SERVANT - POWER OF SUSPENSION - INHERENT RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT - PENDING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS - WEST BENGAL SERVICE RULES, 1936 (SIC) - RULE 7 (V) - RULE 10 - CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND APPEAL) RULES, 1957 - RULE 73 - FUNDAMENTAL RULES - APPENDIX NO. 3 (111) (2) - C. P. AND BERAR FUNDAMENTAL RULES, APPENDIX XXV, PART E, PARA 2.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a confidential assistant of the District Magistrate and Collector, Hooghly, was suspended on the basis of an FIR filed against him under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the West Bengal Security Act. After his discharge in the criminal case, he sought to have the suspension order vacated, arguing that it had come to an end upon his discharge.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the petitioner's suspension was not a substantive punishment but rather an interim measure pending the determination of the criminal proceedings against him. The court found that the government had the inherent right to suspend its servants pending criminal proceedings, and that this power was not limited by any statutory rules or regulations.

Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner's suspension was a substantive punishment or an interim measure pending the determination of the criminal proceedings against him. 2. Whether the government had the inherent right to suspend its servants pending criminal proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the petitioner's suspension was not a substantive punishment but rather an interim measure pending the determination of the criminal proceedings against him. The court found that the government had the inherent right to suspend its servants pending criminal proceedings, and that this power was not limited by any statutory rules or regulations. 2. The court found that the government had the inherent right to suspend its servants pending criminal proceedings, and that this power was not limited by any statutory rules or regulations.

Final Decision: The court discharged the rule and vacated the interim order, holding that the petitioner's suspension was valid and would continue until the determination of the criminal proceedings against him.

SINHA, J.

( 1 ) THE facts in this case are shortly as follows: The petitioner was a confidential assistant of the District Magistrate and Collector, Hooghly. According to the petitioner, his appointing authority was the District Magistrate and his services are governed by the Bengal Services Civil Subordinate (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1936 (sic ). It appears that on or about the 17th January, 1958 a First Information Report was submitted against the petitioner under Section 419/420/114/120b of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 11 of the West Bengal Security Act etc. On the 20th January, 1958 the petitioner was suspended by an order of the District Magistrate. A copy of the order of suspension is annexure "a" to the petition and it is clear there-from that it is based on the F. I. R. mentioned above. Thereafter, he was placed before the Special Court. On or about the 1st December, 1959 the petitioner was discharged, following the decision of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 1958, wherein it had been laid down that a Special Court will only take cognizance on a complaint made in accordance with Section 190 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The very same day, a formal complaint was made in accordance with law and the proceedings continued. On the 11th December, 1959 the petitioner made a representation that as he had been discharged in the criminal case he should be paid all his dues. On the 23rd December, 1959 the Collector of Hooghly passed an order, copy of which is annexure "d" to the petition. It is stated that on technical grounds the petitioner had been discharged but that it had nothing to do with the merits of the case. The order proceeds to state as follows :"complaints have since been filed before the Special Court. Process issued against him. The suspension order should therefore stand. His petition for its vacation is rejected".

( 2 ) THEREAFTER, on the 1st December, 1960 this Rule has been taken out. What is argued is that upon the order of discharge having been made, the original suspension order came to an end, and as there was no new suspension order, the petitioner must be treated as not being under suspension on the date of his discharge. The first question that arises is as to under what provision of law the suspension order was made. Reference has been made to two rules whereby the penalty of suspension can be imposed. In my opinion, we are not dealing here with the "penalty" of suspension. It is true that an employee can be suspended by way of punishment, but in that case it is the suspension which is the substantive punishment and there is no other punishment. Suspension pending a departmental enquiry or a criminal charge is a different matter altogether. There, the petitioner is asked not to associate himself directly with the activities of his employment, because as a result of the pending enquiry or criminal charge it would be embarrassing for all parties concerned, for him to be directly associated with the work of the office. In such a case, some interim arrangement is made for a subsistence allowance and it is implied that if the proceedings enure in his favour, then he would get his full wages. In this case, the petitioner has been suspended because there was a criminal case pending, and not as a substantive punishment.

( 3 ) COMING to the Bengal Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1936 (sic) under which the petitioner says that he is governed, we find that Rule 7 (v) speaks about suspension as a substantive penalty. Rule 10 lays down that except in the case of an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal Court, ho order shall be passed imposing a penalty specified in Rule 7 without giving an adequate opportunity to the employee for making a representation. It will thus be seen that the rules expressly exclude the case of suspension pending the proceedings. There is nothing else in these rules which could be made applicable t



Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top