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HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
B. K. GUHA, P. N. MUKHERJEE, B. N. BANERJEE
MIDNAPORE ZEMINDARY CO. LTD. - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF WEST BENGAL - Respondent
Special Bench Reference In A. F. O. D. 26 Of 1950
Decided On : JUNE 29, 1960
LIMITATION ACT - SUSPENSION OF LIMITATION - BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SECTION 185 - EFFECT ON LIMITATION IN SUITS UNDER SCHEDULE III - MIDNAPORE ZEMINDARY CO. LTD. V. NABA KUMAR SINGH, AIR 1950 CAL 298 - OVERRULED IN PART.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved three questions referred to the court for determination, all relating to the suspension or extension of limitation and the effect of Section 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act on limitation in suits under Schedule III of the Act. The court was asked to consider whether, apart from statute, there could be suspension of limitation or extension of prescribed periods of limitation, whether cases under the Bengal Tenancy Act stood on any special or different footing by reason of Section 185, and whether the decision in Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd. v. Naba Kumar Singh, AIR 1950 Cal 298, was rightly decided.
Finding of the Court:
1. Apart from statute, there may be suspension of limitation or extension of prescribed periods of limitation in three classes of cases: (i) where injustice has been caused by an act of Court, (ii) where the cause of action was satisfied, and (iii) where the cause of action was cancelled. 2. Cases coming under the Bengal Tenancy Act do stand on a special or different footing by reason of Section 185 of the Act, which makes Section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act inapplicable to suits, appeals, and applications specified in Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. However, this exclusion applies only to personal disabilities and not to personal inabilities. 3. The decision in Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd. v. Naba Kumar Singh, AIR 1950 Cal 298, was rightly decided to the extent that it recognized the principle of suspension of limitation in cases of satisfaction or cancellation of the cause of action. However, it was incorrect in holding that the principle of suspension of limitation fully applied to suits under Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act by reason of Section 185 thereof.
Issues: 1. Whether, apart from statute, there may be suspension of limitation or extension of prescribed periods of limitation. 2. Whether, in the above respect, cases coming under the Bengal Tenancy Act stand on any special or different footing by reason of Section 185 of the said Act, which makes, inter alia, Section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act inapplicable to suits, appeals and applications, specified in Schedule III, annexed to the Bengal Tenancy Act. 3. Whether the case of Midnapore Zemindary Co. , Ltd. v. Naba Kumar Singh, AIR 1950 Cal 298, was rightly decided.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the law of limitation postulates a suit and a cause of action for the same, and that limitation starts when the cause of action accrues and the event mentioned in the third column of the relevant Article of the Indian Limitation Act occurs. If the cause of action disappears or becomes extinct due to intervening circumstances, no suit can be brought and limitation will cease to run. The court found no provision in the statute that forbids suspension of limitation on account of suspension or temporary extinction of cause of action or right to sue. 2. The court interpreted Section 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act as excluding the application of Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Indian Limitation Act to suits under Schedule III of the Act. This exclusion applies to personal disabilities but not to personal inabilities. Therefore, the principle of suspension of limitation may have a wider application in suits under Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act in cases of personal inabilities. 3. The court held that the decision in Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd. v. Naba Kumar Singh, AIR 1950 Cal 298, was correct in recognizing the principle of suspension of limitation in cases of satisfaction or cancellation of the cause of action. However, it was incorrect in holding that the principle of suspension of limitation fully applied to suits under Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act by reason of Section 185 thereof.
Final Decision: The court answered all three questions referred to it in the affirmative, subject to the clarifications that cases of satisfaction or cancellation of the cause of action may be dealt with as cases of new or fresh causes of action, and that Section 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not sanction suspension of limitation in cases of intervening personal disabilities but allows such suspension in case of intervening personal inabilities, only where it is otherwise available or permissible.
( 1 ) THREE questions require answer in this Reference. They are, to quote them from what maybe called the order of reference, in the following terms:" (i) Whether, apart from statute, there may be suspension of limitation or extension of prescribed periods of limitation; (ii) whether, in the above respect, cases coming under the Bengal Tenancy Act, stand on any special or different footing by reason of Section 185 of the said Act, which makes, inter alia, Section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act inapplicable to suits, appeals and applications, specified in Schedule III, annexed to the Bengal Tenancy Act; and (iii) whether the case of Midnapore Zemindary Co. , Ltd. v. Naba Kumar Singh, AIR 1950 Cal 298, was rightly decided" and, in answering them, we have only to add that, as they arose before the referring Bench in relation to a suit, our answers would proceed on that footing and would comprehend no greater scope. For purposes of this reference, therefore, the questions referred must be understood with reference to suits and they will be dealt with accordingly.
( 2 ) THE scope of the reference being defined as aforesaid, we proceed now to answer the questions.
( 3 ) THE questions, though framed separately, are so inter-connected that, at least, for purposes of discussion, they may, best and most conveniently, be taken up for consideration together. Indeed, separate treatment of the three questions in watertight compartments is not possible and would hardly be either satisfactory or complete and the preliminary observations, which are necessary for a correct approach to the problem or problems, envisaged by the said questions before us, must clear up certain common grounds to prevent misapprehensions, likely to mislead and to lead to a wrong perspective.
( 4 ) IN essence, and shortly put in the light of the order of reference, the point is whether, apart from the cases, mentioned in the Indian Limitation Act in that behalf, law recognises any rule of suspension or extension of limitation and whether, in view of Section 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, providing, inter alia, that Section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act will not apply to cases under Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act, such cases stand on any different footing in the matter of suspension or extension of limitation, as aforesaid. The decision will, of course, depend mainly on two sections of the Indian Limitation Act, namely, Sections 3 and 9, and certain decisions of the Judicial Committee, to which we shall presently refer, and Section 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that decision will necessarily involve determination of the correctness or otherwise of the above-cited Bench decision of this Court AIR 1950 Cal 298, which also constitutes one of the points (questions) under reference.
( 5 ) BEFORE, howsver, we proceed to the actual consideration of the above questions, it is necessary to state the meaning of the word 'suspension' or 'extension' in the above context. That meaning is best understood by taking or explaining the word as referring to the period, during which time (limitation) for an action (suit) ceases to run.
( 6 ) THE conflict that has arisen and the divergence of judicial opinion on the point that has manifested itself so markedly, centres round the three familiar decisions o the Judicial Committee in the long-famouns triology of cases, reported in Mt. Ranee Surno Moyee v. Shoshee Mokhee Burmonia, 12 Moo Ind App 244 (PC); Mt, Basso Kuar v. Lala Dhun Singh, 15 Ind App 211 (PC); and Sm. Nrityamoni Dassi v. Lakhan Chandra Sen, ILR 43 Cal 660: (AIR 1916 PC 96) and the practical shape, which it has eventually assumed and in which it has ultimately emerged, is best understood in the light of and with reference to the relative proposition, stated and affirmed in the decision, reported in AIR 1950 Cal 298 (supra ). That proposition, succinctly put, is as follows:"apart from Statute (the Indian Limitation Act) limitation may be
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