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1960 Supreme(Cal) 232

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
S. C. Lahiri, H. K. Bose
KANAI LALL SHAW - Appellant
Versus
BHATTU SHAW - Respondent
A. F. O. O.  69  Of  1960
Decided On : NOVEMBER 22, 1960

Advocates Appeared:
S.DAS, S.N.GHORAI

The starting point of limitation for an application under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the date of dismissal, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of the order of dismissal.

Headnote:

RESTORATION OF SUIT - ORDER 9, RULE 9, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - LIMITATION - STARTING POINT - KNOWLEDGE OF ORDER OF DISMISSAL - ORAL APPLICATION - REVIEW - ORDER 47, RULE 1, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff's suit was dismissed for default on November 18, 1959, due to a misprint of the plaintiff's attorney's name in the Peremptory List. The plaintiff claimed to have learned about the dismissal on March 2, 1960, and filed an application for restoration on March 8, 1960, under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the plaintiff's application was barred by limitation under Article 163 of the Indian Limitation Act, as it was filed more than 30 days from the date of dismissal. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the oral application made on March 3, 1960, could be treated as an application for review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as there was no ground set out in the plaintiff's petition that brought the case under any of the three clauses of Order 47, Rule 1.

Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff's application for restoration of the suit was barred by limitation under Article 163 of the Indian Limitation Act? 2. Whether the oral application made on March 3, 1960, could be treated as an application for review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The starting point of limitation for an application under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the date of dismissal, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of the order of dismissal. 2. An oral application cannot be treated as an application under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. An application for review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be based on one of the three grounds specified in the rule.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, holding that the application for restoration of the suit was barred by limitation and that the oral application made on March 3, 1960, could not be treated as an application for review.

LAHIRI, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the plaintiff against an order of Ray, J. , dated March 30, 1960, by which his Lordship has dismissed the plaintiff's application for restoration of a suit Which was dismissed tor default on November 18, 1959. The facts which are relevant for the purposes of the present appeal are these. The plaintiff's suit appeared in the Peremptory List of G. K. Mitter, J. ior some time. But after the reopen-ing of this Court after the Long Vacation of 1959 the suit appeared in the Permptory List of Bay, J. On November 18, 1959, it appeared in the Peremptory List of Ray, J. , but the names of the attorneys of the plaintiff and the defendant were wrongly printed in the Peremptory List. The actual name of the plaintiff's attorney is Mr. S. M. Chatterjee whereas in the Peremptory List it was printed as Mr. S. M. Chowdhury. The correct name of the defendant's attorney is Mr. Atul K. Chatterjee, but in the Peremptory List of November 18, 1959 it was wrongly printed as B. Chatterjee. It is said that as a result of this misprint of the names of the attorneys the plaintiff's attorney lost sight of the suit and took no steps when it was called on lor hearing, with the result that it was dismissed for default with costs. It appears that the defendant's attorney was present. Although the suit was dismissed for default on November 18, 1959, under some strange process, which points to some radical defect in the Office of the Original Side, the suit again made its appearance in the Peremptory List of Datta, J. , and it continued to appear in his Lordship's list on January 28, 1960, January 29, 1960 and February 4, 1960. After that date it again disappeared from the Peremptory List of Datta, J. , till, on February 26, 1960, the plaintiff's counsel mentioned the suit before the Court and under the direction of Datta, J. , it was placed on the Peremptory List of March 2, 1960, as "to be mentioned". On March 2, 1960, the suit appeared in the Peremptory List as "to be mentioned" and as nobody appeared on behalf of the defendant respondent the learned Judge ordered that the suit be fixed for hearing on March 7, 1960. At 2 p. m. on the same date the learned counsel for the defendant stated before the Court that the suit had already been dismissed for default on November 18, 1959 by Ray, J. Thereupon the plaintiffs counsel upon an oral application obtained an order for stay of drawing up of the order of Ray, J. , dated November 18, 1959 and on the plaintiff's prayer for restoration of the suit he was directed to file an application under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On March 8, 1960, the plaintiff took out a notice of motion with the prayers that the order of dismissal dated November 18, 1959 be set aside and that the suit be restored. In the petition the plaintiff made a case to the effect that as a result of the misprint of the names of the attorneys on November 18, 1959, the plaintiff's attorney was misled and the order of dismissal for default was passed by Ray, J. , without the knowledge of the plaintiff or his attorney. The plaintiff further states in this petition that he came to know about the order of dismissal for default for the first time on March 2, 1960, when the learned counsel for the defendant mentioned before Datta, J. , at 2 p. m. that the suit had already been dismissed for default. The plaintiff's case is that he was wholly ignorant of the order of dismissal for default prior to that date. The defendant in his atfidavit-in-opposition challenges the allegations made in the plaintiffs petition and in paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-opposition states that the suit appeared in the Peremptory List of Datta, J. , on January 28, and 29 and February 4, 1960 and that on the last date, that is to say, on February 4, 1960, the learned counsel for the defendant informed the Court that the suit had been dismissed on November 18, 1959, by Ray, J. and therefore the suit had gone out of the list. Th




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