Back
HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
P. B. Mukharji
RAM RANJAN RAKSHIT - Appellant
Versus
CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR, REHABILITATION FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, NEW DELHI - Respondent
Civil Revn. Case 254 Of 1956
Decided On : FEBRUARY 5, 1959
REVENUE RECOVERY ACT - CERTIFICATE PROCEEDINGS - GUARANTOR - LIABILITY - PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT - APPLICABILITY - CERTIFICATE UNDER REVENUE RECOVERY ACT - CONCLUSIVE PROOF - OBJECTIONS - LIMITATION - GUARANTEE - DISCHARGE - INDULGENCE TO BORROWER.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a guarantor for a loan taken by another person from the Rehabilitation Finance Administration, challenged the certificate proceedings initiated against him under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, and the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1890. He argued that as a guarantor, he could not be proceeded against under certificate proceedings and that he was denied the opportunity to file and have his objections heard.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the petitioner, as a guarantor, was a defaulter within the meaning of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, and was liable to pay the loan as arrears of land revenue. The court further held that the certificate issued under the Revenue Recovery Act was conclusive proof of the matters stated therein and could not be challenged by objections under the Public Demands Recovery Act. The court also found that the petitioner's objections were barred by limitation under the Public Demands Recovery Act.
Issues: 1. Whether a guarantor can be proceeded against under certificate proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890? 2. Whether the petitioner was denied the opportunity to file and have his objections heard? 3. Whether the certificate issued under the Revenue Recovery Act was conclusive proof of the matters stated therein? 4. Whether the petitioner's objections were barred by limitation under the Public Demands Recovery Act? 5. Whether the petitioner was discharged from his guarantee due to indulgence granted to the borrower by the Government?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A guarantor is a defaulter within the meaning of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, and is liable to pay the loan as arrears of land revenue. 2. The petitioner was not denied the opportunity to file and have his objections heard, as he was permitted to file objections, which were considered and rejected by the Certificate Officer and the Collector. 3. The certificate issued under the Revenue Recovery Act was conclusive proof of the matters stated therein and could not be challenged by objections under the Public Demands Recovery Act. 4. The petitioner's objections were barred by limitation under the Public Demands Recovery Act. 5. The petitioner was not discharged from his guarantee due to indulgence granted to the borrower by the Government, as the terms of the guarantee expressly provided that such indulgence would not release the petitioner from his liability.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petitioner's application, holding that he had no legal injustice which the court could correct under Article 226 of the Constitution.
( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Ram Ranjan Rakshit against the Chief Administrator, Rehabilitation Finance Administration, New Delhi, the Collector of Krishnagar, the Certificate Officer of Krishnagar and other respondents. The petitioner guaranteed a loan taken by one borrower, Nikhil Bhusan Ghose, from the Rehabilitation Finance Administration. This was done under the provisions of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, 1948, which was a statute, passed for giving financial assistance on reasonable terms to displaced persons to enable them to settle in business and industry. The petitioner guaranteed this loan. The borrower failed to repay the loan whereupon the Chief Administrator, under the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, proceeded to realise it from the petitioner under Certificate proceedings. In the course of the Certificate proceedings, the petitioner objected and filed his objections before the Certificate Officer. His objections have been overruled. From the order of the Certificate Officer, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Collector of Nadia who also dismissed his objections and confirmed the order of the Certificate Officer.
( 2 ) ON 11-11-1955, the Certificate Officer made the order: "you may pay the dues under protest and file a suit. There is no scope of hearing objections in this Certificate. Legal steps will be taken against you if you fail to pay the dues".
( 3 ) MORE or less, on the same ground, the Collector confirmed this order on or about the 2nd of December 1955. The petitioner challenges the order of the Certificate Officer and the Collector.
( 4 ) A number of preliminary points of objection have been taken by the respondents. The first objection is that the necessary party has not been joined in this application. It is argued that under Section 3 of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, 1948, the Rehabilitation Finance Administration is a Corporation, being a body corporate by the name of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration, with perpetual succession and a common seal. This Corporation as such is not made a party. The constitution of this Corporation laid down by Section 4 of the Act indicates that it is composed of a Chairman, called the Chief Administrator, three officials, appointed by the Central Government and three non-officials nominated by the Central Government. Now, as I have said, this Administration as the Statutory Corporation is not made a party to this application, Instead of the Corporation, the Chief Administrator himself is made a respondent in this application. It is said that the Chairman does not and cannot represent the Corporation. Therefore, it is contended that the application is defective on the ground that the main relief sought is against the act of the Corporation which is not made a party. Technically speaking the objection is sound but, I would not like to dismiss this application on that' ground alone,
( 5 ) THE second preliminary objection against this petition is that the petitioner's application is not bona fide and that he has suppressed facts and made false statements in the petition. On this branch of the objection, the argument is confined to two major points. The first is that in paragraph 6 of the petition, the petitioner stated that no document embodying any terms of guarantee and/or letter of guarantee was executed by him. It is pointed out that this statement is a downright falsehood because there is a solemn letter of guarantee duly signed by him, a copy of which is annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition of Sri Ananta Kumar Mitra on behalf of the Chief Administrator, Rehabilitation Finance Administration. This letter is dated 5-5-1951. I shall have occasion later to refer to the terms of this guarantee but it is enough here to state that the petitioner duly signed this letter of guarantee in the presence of witnesses and this letter of guarantee is address
AI
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
