A compromise decree has the effect of an agreement between the parties with the command of the court super-added to it and it can be challenged on any of the grounds on which an agreement can be challenged under the Indian Contract Act.

( 1 ) THE decision of these four appeals turns on a single question and that is whether the State of West Bengal is bound by four compromise decrees passed by the Supreme Court on the 2nd March, 1954, although it was not a party to any of them. The facts upon which this question arises are not in dispute and are as follows:

( 2 ) ON divers dates in the years 1938 and 1939, certain plots of land together with structures and trees standing thereon were acquired by the Land Acquisition Collector for the Calcutta Improvement Trust. Four land acquisition cases were started for the acquisition of these four plots of land. There were two grounds of rival claimants for compensation: (a) the landlords who may be collectively described as the Kochers and (b) the tenants who may be collectively described as the Mitras. In respect of the lands which formed the subject-matter of the acquisition the Collector made joint awards in favour of the landlords and tenants. Against the awards of the Collector the Kocher landlords filed applications for references disputing the amount of compensation and also claiming the entire amounts for themselves to the exclusion of the tenants. Those applications gave rise to four references which were cases Nos. 33, 61, 87 and 93 of 1939. The State of West Bengal was a party to all these valuation references. Besides the above four valuation references, four apportionment cases were also started upon the landlords' plea that they were exclusively entitled to the entire amount of compensation, and these apportionment cases were Nos. 117, 118, 119 and 123 of 1941 in which the State of West Bengal was not impleaded as a party. The Mitra tenants did not file any effective application challenging the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and confined their claim to the shares they were entitled to get in the apportionment cases. In the valuation references made at the instance of the Kocher landlords the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal enhanced the valuation in the following manner: (1) In F. A. 6 of 1955, corresponding to apportionment case No. 117 of 1941, the Collector awarded Rs. 13,627-8-0 as the value of the land and this amount was increased by the Tribunal by Rs. 652-10-0 with costs and interest at the rate six per cent per annum. (2) In F. A. No. 7 of 1955, corresponding to apportionment case No. 123 of 1941, the Collector awarded Rs. 4,140/- as the value of the land which was enhanced by the Tribunal by Rs. 1,384-5-0 with costs and interest at the rate of six per cent per annum. (3) In F. A. No. 8 of 1955, corresponding to apportionment case No. 118 of 1941, the Collector awarded Rs. ll,063/- as the value of the land which was enhanced by the Tribunal by Rs. 2,598-10-9 with costs and interest at the rate of six per cent per annum. (4) In F. A. No, 9 of 1955, corresponding to apportionment case No. 119 of 1941, Collector's award of Rs. 48,012-8-0 was increased by the Tribunal by Rs. 11,199/- with costs and interest at the rate or six per cent per annum.

( 3 ) IT is common ground that since the Mitra tenants did not file any application challenging the Collector's valuation they were not entitled to any part of the enhancement allowed by the Tribunal. This proposition follows from the provisions of Sections 12, 20 (b) and 21 of the Land Acquisition Act and also the decisions of the Judicial Committee and of this Court referred to in the judgment of the Tribunal and is not disputed before us. In the apportionment cases to which the State of West Bengal was not a party the Tribunal held that the Kocher landlords were entitled to 13% annas of the compensation and the Mitra tenants to the remaining 2 1/2 annas share. Against the order of the Tribunal the Mitra tenants filed four First Appeals to this Court which were registered as First Appeals Nos. 91, 93, 94 and 242 of 1945. By a judgment delivered in First Appeal No. 91 of 1945, which was to govern the other three appeals, this Court he