HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
K. C. Das Gupta, B. K. Guha
PARBATI DEVI - Appellant
Versus
KASHMIRILAL SARMA - Respondent
A. F. A. D. 51 Of 1955
Decided On : JUNE 10, 1958
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - SECTION 41 - ESTOPPEL - MONTHLY TENANCY - COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS - Plaintiff purchased property from defendants 3 to 7, heirs of Mangrulal Ahir. Defendant 1 obtained a lease from Kanai Lal Ahir, who claimed to be Mangrulal's son. Plaintiff sued for declaration of title, possession, and injunction. Trial court and appellate court decreed the suit. Defendant 1 appealed.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff purchased property from defendants 3 to 7, heirs of Mangrulal Ahir. Defendant 1 obtained a lease from Kanai Lal Ahir, who claimed to be Mangrulal's son. Plaintiff sued for declaration of title, possession, and injunction. Trial court and appellate court decreed the suit. Defendant 1 appealed.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that defendant 1 was not entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, as the plea was not raised in the pleadings. The court also held that the plaintiffs' vendors were not estopped from challenging the validity of the lease, as they had no duty to inform defendant 1 that Kanai Lal was not Mangrulal's son. The court further held that defendant 1 did not become a monthly tenant of the property, as the receipt of rents by defendants 3 to 7 did not create a landlord-tenant relationship. The court also held that the courts below were correct in granting compensation for the improvement in the land but not for the structures.
Issues: Whether defendant 1 was entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. Whether the plaintiffs' vendors were estopped from challenging the validity of the lease. Whether defendant 1 became a monthly tenant of the property. Whether the courts below were correct in granting compensation for the improvement in the land and the structures.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act protects a transferee who acquires property from an ostensible owner with the consent of the person interested in the property. However, the plea of protection under Section 41 must be clearly taken in the pleadings and put in issue between the parties. In this case, the plea was not raised in the pleadings, so the court could not consider it. Estoppel may arise from the omission of a party to do or say something, but only if there is a duty imposed by law on the party to do or say that thing. In this case, the plaintiffs' vendors had no duty to inform defendant 1 that Kanai Lal was not Mangrulal's son, so they were not estopped from challenging the validity of the lease. A monthly tenancy is created by the payment and acceptance of rent. In this case, the receipt of rents by defendants 3 to 7 did not create a landlord-tenant relationship, as there was no case made in the written statement that such a relationship arose. The courts below were correct in granting compensation for the improvement in the land, as defendant 1 had made improvements to the property without title. However, the courts below were correct in not granting compensation for the structures, as defendant 1 had no title to the land and could not be asked to take the structures on payment of compensation.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs. Defendant 1 was granted three months' time to remove the structures standing on the suit land, failing which the plaintiff would be entitled to take possession in execution.
( 1 ) THE property in litigation belonged originally to Mangrulal Ahir. The plaintiff's case is that on Mangruyal's death, his widow and minor sons, defendants Nos. 3 to 7, became owners of the land as his heirs. The plaintiff purchased this property from defendants Nos. 3 to 7 by a kobala dated the 12th July 1948. In the meantime, on the 1st April 1946 defendant No. 1 had obtained a lease from Kanai Lal Ahir in respect of the land described in Schedule B of the plaint, forming part of the property left by Mangiulal. Kanai Lal executed that deed of lease on behalf of himself and also as guardian of Keshab Prasad Ahir, defendant No. 3. After obtaining the lease, defendant No. 1 filled up the tank in the land of Schedule B and also erected a structure. In that lease, Kanai Lal described himself as the son of Mangrulal Ahir. The plaintiff's case is that Kanailal was not Mangrulal's son but was the son of Mangrulal's wife Babuna by a former husband. He had, therefore, no interest in the land and defendant No. 1 acquired no interest by the lease. The plaintiff prayed for a declaration of his title to the land described in Schedule B, a declaration that the deed of lease was void and not binding upon the plaintiff, a declaration that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no interest in the land in suit and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from exercising any right therein and also for delivery of khas possession and mesne profits and damages.
( 2 ) THE main defence was that Kanailal and Keshab Prasad were the only sons of Mangrulal and defendants Nos. 4 to 6 were not his sons. It was pleaded that the plaintiff had acquired no title by his purchase, and that defendant No. 1 had acquired good title by the deed of lease. It was further pleaded that in any case as the plaintiffs predecessors, the sons and widow of Mangrulal, had Kept quiet when they saw her improving the land and erecting the structure, the plaintiff should not be allowed to obtain possession of this land.
( 3 ) THE trial court accepted the plaintiffs case that Kanailal was not Mangrulal's son and had, therefore, no interest in the land and that by the lease no interest in the property was acquired by defendant No. 1. It held further that defendants Nos. 3 to 7 were the rightful heirs of Mangrulal and the plaintiff acquired good title to the land by his purchase. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain possession of the land because of the conduct of his vendors but thought that equity demanded that the plaintiff should pay Rs. 2000/-as compensation money to defendant No. 1 in respect of the improvement made by the latter in filling up the tank in this property. He accordingly, decreed the suit subject to this that the "plaintiff would have to pay a sum of Rs. 2000/- to defendant No. 1 in respect of the improvement. Defendant No. 1 was also ordered to remove the structure made by her upon the land within a month from the date of the order, failing which it was ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to remove the same by execution of the decree.
( 4 ) ON appeal, the learned District Judge affirmed all the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. He gave a direction that the appellant, defendant No. 1, would have to remove the structure standing on the suit land within two months from the date of his order and in default, the plaintiff respondent would be entitled to remove the same by execution.
( 5 ) THE first contention raised in this second appeal before us was that the defendant No. 1 was entitled to protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section provides:"where, with the consent, express or implied. , of the person interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authori
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